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I: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
During the past thirty years, a new kind of criminal activ-
ity - hate crime - has been recognized across the country. 
How best to define hate crimes and guard against them 
has been puzzling legislators in many states.1 Under con-
ventional criminal law, a perpetrator is convicted and jailed 
for committing a bad act against any victim - a non-justi-
fied killing is murder or manslaughter, for instance, no 
matter who the dead person turns out to be and regardless 
of the motivation. But to commit a hate crime, you have to 
target someone for a specific reason. The crime must be 
motivated in some part by an animus toward, or a specific 
opinion about, a person because of his race, religion, eth-
nicity, or any one of several other particular characteristics. 
Although the criminal act may be the same, regardless of 
the victim's status, the hate criminal risks a heftier sen-
tence by harming certain people for particular reasons. 
Though it is easy to understand hate crime abstractly, 
it has proven more difficult to express its essence in legis-
lative enactments. The consequence of legislators' increas-
ing desire to punish acts aimed at people who share partic-
ular characteristics has led to a range of laws that are not 
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always consistent from state to state. In what follows, we 
propose a way of sorting out how legislators have sought 
to describe and punish what emerging social norms are 
singling out as particularly pernicious behavior. 
The first federal statute to create "federally protected 
activities" was enacted in as part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, in response to violent attacks on civil rights 
workers in the south. This federal law criminalized inter-
ference with activities such as voting, attending school or 
applying for employment because of a person's race, 
color, religion or national origin. 2 The statute was signifi-
cant because for the first time it gave the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice the power to investigate hate crimes. 
In the 1980s, catalyzed by studies that indicated an 
increase in bias-motivated crimes, the first contemporary 
hate-crime statutes were enacted. 3 Many states created 
"task forces," similar to President Reagan's "Task Force 
on Crime," to study this issue.4 In addition to state stat-
utes, Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 
1990, which requires the Justice Department to acquire 
and compile data on hate crimes annually.5 
In 1993, Wisconsin v. Mitchell upheld the constitu-
tionality of hate crime statutes. ~ In Mitchell, a group of 
African-American young men, including the defendant, 
became angry after discussing a scene from the film Mis-
sissippi Burning in which a white man beat an African-
American boy who was praying. After the group had a 
few drinks, the defendant is quoted as saying, "Do you feel 
all hyped up to move on some white people?" Upon seeing 
fourteen-year-old Gregory Reddick, who was white, the 
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defendant prompted the group to "go get him." The group 
of about ten young men attacked Reddick, putting him in 
a coma for four days. 
The issue in Mitchell was whether a Wisconsin statute 
that enhanced the penalty for crimes motivated by a vic-
tim's perceived status was constitutional under the First 
Amendment. The defendant argued that in penalizing 
people for offensive thoughts the statute violated his First 
Amendment rights. The Court unanimously disagreed, 
noting that the defendant was not being punished for his 
bigoted beliefs or statements. Rather, "the Wisconsin 
statute singles out for enhancement bias inspired conduct 
because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individ-
ual and societal harm .... The State's desire to redress 
these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation 
for its penalty enhancement provision over and above 
mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases."7 
Since the pivotal decision in Mitchell, all fifty states 
have enacted some form of anti-discrimination or hate 
crime statute. Not all of these outlaw what might be con-
sidered a "hate crime" in the traditional sense, like assault-
ing a person because of the color of his skin. A few states 
have limited their hate crime law to only the most basic 
"desecration" related crimes; for example, damaging ob-
jects like a church, which are revered by particular mem-
bers of the public. 
In 1994, Congress directed the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to factor in bias or hate into the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. 8 In response, the Commission 
amended Section 3Al.1 of the Guidelines so that if "the 
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finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally 
selected any victim or any property as the object of the 
offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, 
gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation of any 
person," the offense level of the crime would be increased, 
increasing the applicable sentence range for the crime.9 
In 2009, President Barack Obama signed the Mat-
thew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act.10 The act was named after the victims of two 
bias-motivated murders in 1998. Matthew Shepard was a 
21-year-old man who was tortured and murdered be-
cause he was homosexual. James Byrd, Jr. was a 49-year 
old father who was brutally murdered by three white as-
sailants in Texas because he was African-American. 
Among other things, the 2009 Act gives the Depart-
ment of Justice jurisdiction over some hate crimes. The 
law allows federal prosecution when a state's Attorney 
General certifies that the state lacks the ability to prose-
cute the hate crime, the state requests that the federal 
government prosecute the crime, the sentence obtained 
by the state did not serve the federal interest of eradicat-
ing hate crimes, or a federal prosecution is in the public 
interest.11 Federal investigators and federal grand juries 
are given unfettered discretion to investigate hate crimes. 
This law has not yet had much of an effect. Fewer than 
100 people have been charged under the statute since its 
enactment, and no convictions have been obtained. 
4 
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At a luncheon commemorating the act 's signing, 
President O bama sa id: 
You understood that we must stand aga inst 
crimes that are mea nt not only to brea k 
bones, but to brea k spirits - not only to 
inflict harm, but to instill fea r . .. th rough 
this law, we will strengthen the protections 
aga inst crimes based on the color of your 
skin , the fa ith in your hea rt, or the place 
of your birth . We will finally add federa l 
protections against crimes based on gen-
der, disability, gender identity, or sexual 
orientation. And prosecutors will have new 
tools to work with states in order to prose-
cute to the fullest those who would 
perpetrate such crimes. Because no one in 
America should ever be afra id to wa lk 
down the street holding the hands of the 
person they love. No one in America 
should be fo rced to look over their shoul-
der because of who they are or beca use 
they live with a disability. 12 
In the short history of hate crime laws, the statistics 
indicate that racially-motivated hate crimes have been 
and are still the most prevalent, accounting fo r approx i-
mately 48.5% of reported hate crimes in 2009. In that 
same yea r religiously-motivated incidents accounted for 
19.7% of hate crimes; sexua l orientation-motivated inci-
dents, 18.5%, and incidents motivated by ethnicity, 
11.8% .1 3 
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11: DEFINITION OF HATE CRIME 
In some states, a hate crime is broadly defined as any 
crime in which the victim, or the particular criminal 
action, was chosen because of the actual or perceived 
characteristics of any person (not necessarily the victim). 
In other states, a hate crime is narrowly defined as a par-
ticular criminal action intended to intimidate or harass 
the victim because of the victim's characteristics. Some 
hate crimes don't appear, even on their face, to be hate-
related, such as desecration-related crimes, but we include 
them in this monograph because the acts covered by 
those laws, church or cross burning, for example, are 
often committed with the same hate motive present in 
more traditional hate crimes. 
Two elements comprise most hate crimes: (1) a crimi-
nal act that is (2) committed with a bias motive. The first 
element merely means that the legislature must declare 
the action criminal. Criminal acts can range from estab-
lished crimes, like murder or assault, to acts as simple as 
causing physical contact with a person.14 The second ele-
ment, bias motive, is what sets hate crimes apart from 
any other category of crime. It is also the harder element 
to prove, because it requires evidence of the mental state 
of the assailant at the time the offense was committed. 
However, not all hate crimes fall neatly into this defi-
nition. Some hate crime laws do not actually require a 
hate or bias motive, but the law obviously applies when 
that motive exists.15 Since not all hate crime laws actually 
refer to hate or bias, it can be difficult to define what laws 
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actually deal with those subjects. Also, some hate crime 
laws prohibit acts that would not be criminal but for the 
prohibited motive, further confounding any effort to list 
two elements that all hate crime laws share. 
There is no universal definition of a hate crime. Some 
states cite characteristics such as race, sexual orientation, 
and disability very specifically in the text of the statute as 
protected characteristics. Other states have laws worded so 
broadly that any crime committed because of any one of 
the victim's characteristics might trigger the statute. In fed-
eral and most state law the victim's actual characteristics 
are immaterial. As long as a crime was committed or the 
victim chosen because the defendant believed the victim be-
longed to a particular group, the hate crime law applies. 
Ill: PURPOSES OF HATE-CRIME 
LEGISLATION 
The primary objective of hate crime legislation is to pro-
tect against the harm a diverse society suffers when 
people are victimized simply for being who they are. The 
idea is that when certain people are targeted because they 
belong to a certain social category, society is damaged 
more than when crimes happen for other reasons. For 
example, the New York legislature has stated that "crimes 
motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups 
not only harm individual victims but send a powerful 
message of intolerance and discrimination to all members 
of the group to which the victim belongs. Hate crimes 
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can and do intimidate and disrupt entire communities 
and vitiate the civility that is essential to healthy demo-
cratic processes. In a democratic society, citizens cannot 
be required to approve of the beliefs and practices of oth-
ers, but must never commit criminal acts on account of 
them." 16 The premise is that the fear generated in various 
groups when a member is targeted for that characteristic 
requires an additional response to the crime. 
There are other, highly debated reasons why hate 
crime legislation exists. We address how the five theories 
of punishment - retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, 
rehabilitation and restoration - relate to hate crimes. 
Retribution 
On the simplest level, retribution theory proclaims 
that someone who caused harm else deserves to be harmed 
in return. Hate crimes might deserve stiffer penalties be-
cause of their social detriments. Not placing some kind of 
enhancement on such an act would be condoning it, leav-
ing law enforcement without a way to respond to instances 
involving a more heinous motive than common crimes. 
The damage the crime does to society, in addition to the 
individual victim, warrants an additional response. 
Under retribution theory, hate crime legislation exists 
because bias-motivated crimes are more severe. It's a the-
ory based largely on a proportionality argument. Hate 
crimes differ from ordinary offenses in that they have a 
greater psychological and social impact on the individual 
and the group that the victim represents. The sentencing 
enhancements associated with bias-motivated crimes en-
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sure the punishment is proportionate to the harm. 17 The 
Court in Mitchell said: "bias-motivated crimes are more 
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emo-
tional harms on their victims, and incite community un-
rest." 18 Since the consequences of hate crimes are more se-
vere, the punishments for hate crimes should be more 
severe as well. 
Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is the theory that punishing offenders 
through imprisonment is justified because it removes 
immoral and dangerous people from the rest of society, 
preventing them from causing further harm. Since bias-
motivated crimes cause a greater harm to society as a whole 
than ordinary crimes, the people who commit these crimes 
are more dangerous to society. The longer they are impris-
oned, the longer they are prevented from committing an-
other crime against individuals and society. 1 ~ 
This theory is prevalent throughout most hate-crime 
laws. Most such statutes do not provide for assistance to 
the victim or the victim's community or any other method 
of trying to repair the harm caused by the hate crime. 
Most simply require or permit a hate crime defendant to 
be sentenced to longer periods of incarceration. A sub-
scriber to the policies of incapacitation theory, along with 
retribution, would support this response to hate crimes. 
Deterrence 
Deterrence theory presupposes that the threat of a 
harsher punishment will discourage people from engag-
9 
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ing in offenses motivated by bias. An example needs to be 
made of those who commit hate crimes to deter others 
who might commit them. 20 An example also needs to be 
made of the particular offender so that he or she will not 
commit future hate crimes. 
There are arguments that deterrence might not be ef-
fective for hate crimes. Many hate crime offenders are 
unaware of hate crime laws. 21 Furthermore, the chances 
that a crime will actually be prosecuted as a hate crime 
are unknown. A hate-crime prosecution can happen only 
if there are provable circumstantial facts of the perpetra-
tor's state of mind when committing the crime. A person 
who is aware of the hate-crime law might commit his 
crime in a way to make sure no evidence of the motive 
exists, such as choosing to not yell racial epithets when 
committing the crime. 
A common response is that the enhanced penalties 
can deter systemic or systematic hate crimes. By punish-
ing these acts more harshly, the government sends a 
warning to individuals who might otherwise engage in 
hate crimes on a regular basis. Groups such as the Ku 
Klux Klan and various Neo-Nazi groups, which publicly 
express bias against people with particular characteris-
tics, will undoubtedly know about hate crime laws. The 
laws may generally deter hate crimes by these groups or 
individual members of these groups. 
Rehabilitation 
Though not every state statute provides rehabilitation 
for bias-crime offenders, some do. Proponents of rehabili-
10 
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tation as a purpose for enacting hate-crime statutes argue 
that improving the offender makes him less likely to of-
fe nd aga in .22 For example, Pennsylvania specifica lly al-
lows for rehabilitative sentences fo r hate crime offenders. 
If, in the opinion of the court, the defendant would ben-
efit , the court ca n sentence that defendant to community 
service for certain bias-related offenses.H Such sentences 
are simila r to the those encompassed in the state's Accel-
erated Rehabilitative Disposition Program. 24 
M any states permit or require judges to order defen-
dants convicted of hate crimes to attend dive rsity o r be-
havioral training courses. These courses can be forced 
upon defendants whether or not the sentence includes in-
carceration . Some states even require the defendant to 
work with the victim or other people with that victim's 
characteristics, often forcing the defendant to fulfill com-
munity service sentences within the harmed community. 
Restoration 
The fifth principle, restoration, has been ga ining sig-
nificant traction as a purpose fo r hate crime laws. The 
punishments that fulfill this purpose are usually community 
service and payment or labor to repair property damage. 
The most striking example is the Colorado law that allow 
the victims of hate crimes to ask the court to place the de-
fendant into alternative dispute resolution.ZS The defen-
dant will no longer be charged with a hate crime, but will 
receive collateral punishments that are supposed to help 




The premise underlying the theory of restoration is 
that hate-crime laws should prevent damage to the com-
munity and fear among vulnerable classes of people. Res-
toration addresses those concerns by forcing defendants 
to mend the harm that they caused, letting the commu-
nity and the victim know that the state is stepping in to 
protect or redress them. It also exposes the wrongdoer to 
the harmed community and to confront the damage his 
or her actions caused within that community. In this way, 
this theory meshes with rehabilitative justice concerns. 
California provides an example of a law explicitly 
stating that one of the principal goals of the state's hate-
crime statutes is restorative justice for both the victim 
and the community. The laws are supposed to take into 
consideration "restorative justice for the immediate vic-
tims of the hate crimes and for the classes of persons ter-
rorized by the hate crimes."26 
IV: TYPES OF HATE CRIME STATUTES 
We have divided hate crime statutes into four categories, 
and each category into specific subtypes. 
The four general categories of hate crime laws are: 
Creation of a New Crime: Create new, separate stat-
utes prohibiting bias-related crimes. 
Sentence Enhancement: Enhance the severity of the 
sentence for crimes proven to be motivated by bias. 
Sentence Enhancement (Aggravating Factors): Treat 
bias as an aggravating factor when determining a sentence. 
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Speci"fic Hate Related Acts: Prohibit acts that are un-
mistakably motivated by bias. For example, burning a 
cross on someone's lawn or spray painting a swastika on 
a religious center are hate-related acts. 
V: EXPLAINING THE TYPES OF HATE 
CRIMES 
Hate crime legislation (sometimes called "bias" legisla-
tion) can have an effect on evidentiary, jurisdictional, and 
sentencing issues. We describe our category system of 
types and sub-types of hate crime laws and discuss issues 
presented by each of those subtypes. 
Type I: Creation of a New Crime 
Many states have passed laws declaring that certain 
actions constitute a new crime when the act was commit-
ted, or the victim was chosen, because of the victim's 
characteristics or membership in a particular group. 
These laws proscribe specific acts which on their own are 
usually already punishable under a different statute. 
These acts can be described in a list of specific actions or 
by reference to other criminal offenses. The states with 
this form of law have decided to make bias-motivated 
acts punishable under separate and distinct criminal stat-
utes. These hate-crime laws always include a motive ele-
ment, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite 
bias. 
13 
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Subtype 1.1: Prohibit committing other crimes, but 
add a bias element 
A statute must meet three criteria to fall into this sub-
category. It must: (1) prohibit committing other statuto-
rily defined crimes, which themselves are misdemeanors 
or felonies; (2) prohibit committing those underlying 
crimes, picking the victim, or both, because of a bias 
against or hatred toward a person; and (3) declare that a 
violation of the law is a felony or misdemeanor. 
Illinois provides an example of how a new criminal 
statute uses other criminal statutes as the underlying act . 
The state's hate crime statute provides that "a person com-
mits a hate crime when, by reason of the actual or per-
ceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual 
orientation, physical or mental disability, or national ori -
gin of another individual or group of individuals, regard-
less of the existence of any other motivating factor or fac-
tors, he commits" one of 15 listed crimes.27 
These underlying crimes range from assault to ha-
rassment by telephone to theft. Separate and distinct from 
the underlying offense, a violation of this hate crime stat-
ute is a crime on its own. Prosecutors pursuing charges 
under this statute will charge the hate crime in addition 
to the underlying crime. 28 To convict under this statute, 
the prosecution must prove all elements of the underlying 
crime and the added element of commission of that crime 
because of the actual or perceived characteristics of "an-
other individual or group of individuals, regardless of the 
existence of any other motivating factor or factors." 29 
In the Illinois statute, the bias element does not need 
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to be satisfied by bias about actual or perceived charac-
teristics of the victim, although that scenario will likely 
almost always be the case. It also does not require any 
animosity toward the individual or group of individuals. 
Rather, the law, and most laws similar to Illinois', merely 
state that the crime must be motivated by any feelings 
about any individual or group of individuals. This is an 
aspect common in the broadest hate crime statutes. While 
seemingly ridiculous, a person could be charged with a 
hare crime if, because he hares homosexuals and was 
forced to work with homosexuals , he throws rocks at cars 
in his neighborhood when he gets home. There is no con -
nection between the victims and the characteristics he 
has a bias about, yet he still committed a crime because 
of the actual or perceived characteristics of an individual 
or group of individuals, so the hate crime would be 
applicable. 
This kind of language also leaves open the possibility 
that a prosecutor, working within the terms of the stat-
ute, could charge a hate crime even though the defendant 
feels no actual hatred toward the victim. A defendant 
who chose to steal from a Bosnian victim because he be-
lieved that people from Bosnia are less likely to report 
thefts to the police would violate this law. A more far-
fetched example, but still theoretically possible, is a ca-
reer thief who would only rob people who were not of 
Polish descent. The defendant could have no bias at all 
against people from whichever country the victim hap-
pens to be from. The fact that the defendant committed 
the particular crime against the particular victim because 
15 
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of a national origin-related belief (that robbing Polish 
people was unacceptable) could still trigger this kind of 
hate-crime statute. 30 
Subtype 1.2: Prohibit specific actions when commit-
ted because of bias 
To fall into this category, a statute must: (1) prohibit 
specific actions, with no reference to another statute, even 
if the actions would satisfy the elements of another crime; 
(2) prohibit committing those acts, picking the victim, or 
both, because of a bias toward or hatred of a person; and 
(3) declare that a violation of the statute is a crime. 
Michigan's "Ethnic Intimidation" law is highly repre-
sentative of this kind of statute. It provides that "a person 
is guilty of ethnic intimidation if that person maliciously, 
and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another 
person because of that person's race, color, religion, gen-
der, or national origin, does any of the following" acts. 31 
These acts include causing "physical contact with another 
person," property destruction, and threats. 32 These acts 
are not tied to any other criminal statute, though the un-
derlying conduct can often be charged as a separate crime. 
Statutes such as Michigan's require that the prosecu-
tion prove an intent to intimidate or harass. Other stat-
utes falling into this subcategory, such as the federal hate 
crime statute, do not have this element. The federal hate 
crime statute prohibits causing "bodily injury to any per-
son ... because of the actual or perceived [characteris-
tics] of any person."33 This difference can have important 
practical implications. An accusatory instrument34 charg-
ing a violation of a statute requiring proof of the intent to 
16 
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intimidate or harass, but containing no allegations of that 
specific intent, may be facially insufficient. A facially in-
sufficient accusatory instrument does not allege facts 
which, if true, establish reasonable cause to believe that 
the defendant committed every element of every offense 
charged. 35 
For example, an accusatory instrument in Michigan 
that merely alleges that a group of white people attacked 
a black man would likely be insufficient to support the 
crime of "ethnic intimidation." Though the attack might 
have been motivated by race, the motive cannot be in-
ferred simply by the fact that the defendants and victim 
were of different race. However, an accusatory instru-
ment that also alleges that the attackers were yelling ra-
cial epithets at the victim while the attack was taking 
place, or had just come from a Ku Klux Klan rally, would 
likely be sufficient. 
Subtype 1.3: Prohibit deprivation of or interfering 
with another's civil rights 
A statute in this category can take a variety of forms. 
However, to fall within this category, a statute must: (1) 
prohibit behavior intended to interfere with, or deprive 
others of, certain civil rights; and (2) make a violation of 
the statute a felony or misdemeanor. Some jurisdictions 
protect civil rights expansively, such as all rights guaran-
teed to a person by the Constitution and laws of both the 
United States and the particular state . .i6 Other jurisdic-
tions include only specific protections, the most limited 
being a protection of the right to "to life, liberty, pursuit 
of happiness or the necessities of life," excluding all oth-
17 
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ers. 37 Some laws of this subtype prohibit violation of a 
single right, interference with religious worship. 38 There 
is a continuum between these extremes, though most 
statutes in this subtype tend to be fairly expansive. 
A bias or hate motive is not an element of most of 
these statutes. The only constant across all these statutes 
is the motive of intent to interfere with or deprive others 
of civil rights. However, a few states have passed legisla-
tion declaring that a person has a civil right to be free of 
the various forms bias or hate crimes might take. It is pos-
sible that a prosecutor can charge a crime of interference 
with civil rights based on a defendant's violation of the 
victim's separately established civil right to be free of bias 
or hate-related actions. The victim's right to be free of this 
form of crime is established in one statute, usually in a 
"Human Rights" or "Civil Rights" section of the state's 
statutory code. The defendant is punished for interfering 
with that right on the basis of another, related statute. 
Maine provides a good example of how this dual-
statute strategy could be used. Maine has established a 
civil right to be free of bias or hate-related acts. The rele-
vant statute declares that "for purposes of this chapter 
and Title 17, section 2931, a person has the right to en-
gage in lawful activities without being subject to physical 
force or violence, damage or destruction of property, tres-
pass on property or the threat of physical force or vio-
lence motivated by reason of race, color, religion, sex, an-
cestry, national origin, physical or mental disability or 
sexual orientation."39 Title 17, section 2931, declares that 
"a person may not, by force or threat of force, intention-
18 
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ally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally 
attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intention-
ally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that 
person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State 
or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United 
States."40 A violation of section 2931 is a crime.41 These 
two statutes, together, create a new right (to be free of 
hate crimes) and criminalize the violation of that new 
right (the violation being commission of a hate crime). 
On its face, Maine's criminal statute prohibiting acts 
interfering with or depriving others of civil rights would 
seem to be only mildly related to bias or hate crimes. 
However, because of the separately established right to be 
free of hate or bias-related actions, the statute can actu-
ally be used to prosecute hate crimes.42 In a jurisdiction 
that has not enacted a civil right like the one in Maine, a 
statute prohibiting acts interfering or depriving others of 
civil rights has a much more limited effect. Only highly 
specific acts, like interfering with voting rights, could 
apply to the law. 
In states with statutes prohibiting interference with 
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution or laws, the 
federal statute on interfering with rights becomes a 
weapon against hate crimes. The rights guaranteed by the 
federal statute are not extensive, but it lists some rights 
which are protected against interference when that inter-
ference is motivated by bias or hate against a short list of 
characteristics.43 Even if the state itself has not established 
a civil right to be free of bias or hate related acts, very 
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specific acts might still be prosecutable if they were in-
tended to interfere with these federally guaranteed rights. 
Type 2: Sentencing Enhancements 
Many states have sentencing enhancement statutes 
which increase the potential punishment a defendant can 
receive when certain acts are committed, or the victim is 
chosen, because of the victim's characteristics or mem-
bership in a particular group. These statutes can take a 
variety of forms. Some require the court to impose a 
harsher penalty while others merely allow it. Some in-
crease the potential penalty by raising the level or degree 
of the bias crime within the state's penal law, while other 
statutes merely increase the potential length of incarcera-
tion or add collateral punishments. Some of these laws 
apply to any crime in the jurisdiction while others apply 
only to crimes related to intimidation or harassment. For 
all sentencing enhancement laws, the prosecutor must 
prove the underlying crime in addition to whatever ele-
ment is required for the enhancement. 
The statute itself will usually list what factors trigger 
the sentencing enhancement. In some states the factor is 
determined by the finder of fact at trial, under a reason-
able doubt standard, just as if it were an element of the 
crime. In others, the court determines the factor after the 
defendant has been convicted of the underlying crime. 
Sentencing enhancements vary tremendously from state 
to state. However they are structured, under the rule set 
down in 2000 in Apprendi v. New Jersey, any enhance-
ment that increases the maximum allowable length of in-
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carceration must be proven to the finder of fact, usually a 
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. 44 
Subtype 2 .1 : Increase the degree of all, or almost all, 
crimes 
A statute of this subtype must meet three criteria. It 
must (1) indicate that it applies to any crime, or at least 
a lmost all crimes which have a victim; (2) require proof 
of bias, prejudice, or hate as a reason for the crime or rea-
son for picking the victim; and (3) reclassify such crimes 
as a higher degree or level within the state's criminal law, 
thereby increasing the potential sentence the defendant 
can receive. 
An example of this kind of law is a Florida statute ti-
tled "Evidence prejudice while committing offense; re-
classification." It reads that "the penalty for any felony or 
misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this sub-
section if the commission of such fe lony or misdemeanor 
evidences prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, eth-
nicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, home-
less status, mental or physical disability, or advanced age 
of the victim."45 The statute specifies how each type of 
crime should be reclassified. For example, a misdemeanor 
of the second degree becomes a misdemeanor of the first 
degree.46 
Laws like this often do not require prejudice to be the 
sole motivation for the crime or choice of victim.47 In 
Florida, and many other states with similar laws, it is 
enough that prejudice was at least part of the motivation . 
Prejudice becomes an additional element, one not located 
in the text defining the underlying crime. Since it is set up 
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as a penalty enhancement for a huge swath of crimes, this 
subtype of hate-crime statute will always be found in a 
separate section of a state's criminal code, apart from the 
substantive offenses. 
Laws that increase the degree of crime are broad, and 
can be applied to a wide variety of different situations. By 
its very terms, a subtype 2.1 statute does not usually re-
quire "hatred," as the word is commonly used. Consider 
Florida's statute again. All that the statute requires is that 
the defendant show prejudice against one of the listed 
groups. As an example, consider a scene in Stanley Ku-
brick's movie "A Clockwork Orange." The main charac-
ter and his gang travel around an English city committing 
a series of horrific crimes, including assaulting a homeless 
man. This crime seems to be committed because of the 
gang's feelings about the homeless man's relative vulner-
ability. They probably believe that he is less likely to re-
port the crime or defend himself than a non-homeless 
person. Even though the gang does not hate the victim in 
any conventional sense, the assault could be charged as a 
hate crime under Florida's law. The prejudice that the 
gang is evidencing is the belief that homeless people are 
more vulnerable. 
Queens County, New York, has used New York's 
hate crime statute in a creative way. New York's statute 
increases the level of a crime under situations very similar 
to Florida's. The statute applies if a defendant selects the 
victim or commits the crime "in whole or in substantial 
part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, 
color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious 
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practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, 
regardless of whether that belief or perception is cor-
rect."48 The statute applies to "specified offenses," but the 
list of specified offenses is extremely long and covers a 
huge variety of crimes. Queens County prosecutors have 
capitalized on the expansive language by applying the 
hate crime statutes to mortgage fraud cases with elderly 
victims. In these cases, defendants targeted elderly vic-
tims because the defendants believed that elderly people 
were easier targets or that they were more likely to have 
substantial home equity. Queens County prosecutors 
have secured at least five guilty pleas or convictions for 
grand larceny with a hate-crime enhancement under 
these or similar circumstancesY 
The bias that triggers the New York law and laws 
like it does not need to match the victim's actual charac-
teristics. For example, consider a man who goes to a bar 
looking to start a fight, but believes that Germans are 
better fighters, so he doesn't want to fight a German. He 
fights a person at the bar when he learns that the person 
is not German. Though this scenario is farfetched, the 
fight could theoretically trigger New York's hate crime-
statute because the perpetrator selected the victim on the 
basis of a belief about the national origin of a person, 
even though the person he had the belief about was a per-
son other than the victim. 
Some states have different approaches for different 
levels of crime. Delaware, for example, has a statute that 
contains two different hate crime enhancements. For mis-
demeanors and crimes which are lesser C, D, E, For G 
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felonies, the statute falls into subtype 2.1, as the level of 
the crime is increased.50 However, A and B felonies found 
to be hate crimes have their minimum sentences doubled, 
without increasing the degree of the crime. These belong 
in Subtype 2.3, below. Similar nuances exist in many 
jurisdictions. 
Statutes like New York's raise an interesting dilemma. 
In many states, lower criminal courts have full subject-
matter jurisdiction over all stages of misdemeanor crimi-
nal cases, but only preliminary jurisdiction over felonies 
(meaning that a judge sitting in the lower court could not 
oversee the trial, for example). The increase in criminal 
degree from misdemeanor to felony would seem to re-
move subject-matter jurisdiction from lower criminal 
courts even though the underlying crime was a misde-
meanor. 51 We suspect that a crime that is enhanced to a 
felony would need to be heard by a court with jurisdic-
tion over felonies. This issue is less clear in Subtypes 2.3 
and 2.4, discussed below, where the statute increases the 
potential punishment into the felony range (usually more 
than a year's imprisonment) without changing the crime's 
degree from misdemeanor to felony. 
Subtype 2.2: Increase degree of crimes involving in-
timidation or harassment 
A statute must meet three criteria to fall into this cat-
egory. It must: (1) apply only to crimes involving intimida-
tion or harassment; (2) require proof of bias, prejudice, or 
hate as a reason for committing the crime or picking the 
victim; and (3) reclassify crimes which show this evidence 
or proof as a higher degree crime, thereby increasing the 
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potential sentence. Though this type of statute works in 
much the same way as those in Subtype 2.1, they are more 
limited in scope. Unlike Subtype 2.1 enhancements, some 
of these enhancements are contained within the statutes 
prohibiting the underlying crimes; they are not always set 
out in a separate statute. 
Many laws in Minnesota's criminal code have hate-
crime enhancements built into the law prohibiting the un-
derlying conduct. Two examples are the laws dealing 
with harassment and stalking and with property damage. 
Bias against the characteristics of the victim or someone 
else increases the degree of the crime. 
Minnesota's harassment and stalking statute prohibits 
a number of different acts, including stalking, making ha-
rassing phone calls, and manifesting an intent to injure 
the person, property, or rights of another.52 It classifies 
these acts as a gross misdemeanor. Under the subdivision, 
"Aggravated Violations," a person who commits any of a 
set of listed acts is guilty of a felony. The first act on the 
list is committing any of the harassing acts "because of 
the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, re-
ligion, sex, sexual orientation, disability ... age, or na-
tional origin."53 Thus, having a prohibited subjective moti-
vation for committing any of the listed acts increases the 
criminal level of harassment from a misdemeanor to a 
felony. 
Minnesota's statute prohibiting damage to property is 
set up similarly. The statute defines four degrees of the 
crime. An increase in degree can be due to the crime's 
being motivated by "the property owner's or another's ac-
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tual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, disability ... age, or national origin."54 Nebraska 
puts the enhancement and the underlying crimes in sepa-
rate statutes. A statute titled "Enhanced penalty; enumer-
ated offenses" applies to a list of 20 criminal statutes, in-
cluding manslaughter, assau lt, sexual assault, arson, 
crimina l trespass, and even application of graffiti . The 
hate-crime statute refers to these other crimes, but unlike 
Minnesota's property damage law, the enhancement and 
the underlying crimes are not contained in the same sec-
tion of the penal law. 
The enhancement statute prohibits committing "one 
or more of the .. . [listed] offenses against a person or a 
person's property because of the person's race, color, reli-
gion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, age, or disability or because of the person's associa-
tion with a person of a certain race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, 
or disability."55 The prosecution must prove beyond area-
sonable doubt that this motivation was a cause of the un-
derlying crime.56 
Subtype 2.2 hate-crime statutes are much more nar-
rowly tailored to acts that one might normally think of as 
hate-motivated crimes than acts criminalized in states 
like New York. Although subtype 2.2 statutes generally 
don't use the word "hate," the limited list of crimes or 
acts often restricts the statutes' use to just such a motiva-
tion. This restriction keeps prosecutors from using the 
statute in innovative ways, like the financial crimes pros-
ecutions in Queens. 
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Subtype 2.3: Add jail time or other consequences for 
all, or almost all, crimes 
Statutes in this category can mandate a variety of dif-
ferent additiona l penalties if a defendant is convicted of 
a lmost any crime deemed to be a hate or bias-related 
crime. Some statutes tack additional time onto the maxi-
mum or minimum sentence that could otherwise be im-
posed. Some statutes require a convicted defendant to 
complete behavior modification programs. Other statutes 
require a convicted defendant to complete community 
serv ice or pay reparations to either the victim or the com-
munity. The key element that places a hate crime statute 
into this category is that the statute discretely defines a 
specific enhanced or additional penalty. These statutes do 
not change the degree of the underlying crime. 
Rhode Island's Hate Crime Sentencing Act is a clear 
example of a law that increases mandatory incarceration. 
This statute applies to any defendant who has been con-
victed of intentionally selecting "the person against whom 
the offense is committed or [selecting] the property that is 
damaged or otherwise affected by the offense because of 
the actor's hatred or animus toward the actual or per-
ceived disability, religion, color, race, national origin or 
ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of that person or 
the owner or occupant of that property."57 The hatred or 
animus must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by ei-
ther the finder of fact at trial or the judge at sentencing. 
The statute imposes mandatory enhanced sentences: for 
misdemeanors, a minimum sentence of thirty days im-
prisonment; for fe lonies, an additional sentence of be-
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tween one and five years. This additional sentence must 
run consecutively (after the sentence for the underlying 
crime has been served). 
Louisiana has a law that increases the potential pen-
alty for defendants convicted of a hate crime. It differs 
from the Rhode Island statute by listing the underlying 
crimes to which it applies. However, the list is so extensive 
that the statute essentially applies to almost any crime 
which could be committed against the person or property 
of another because of the other's characteristics, including 
crimes beyond those typically intended to intimidate or 
harass. The statute makes it "unlawful for any person to 
select the victim of the following offenses against person 
or property because of actual or perceived race, age, gen-
der, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin, or ancestry of that person or the owner 
or occupant of that property because of actual or per-
ceived membership or service in, or employment with, an 
organization."58 The statute lists 33 crimes against person 
or property, ranging from murder to molestation to "com-
municating false information of planned arson."59 The 
court is permitted to sentence a defendant who falls under 
this statute to an additional $500 fine or an additional six 
months' incarceration, or both, if the underlying crime is 
a misdemeanor. If the underlying crime is a felony, the 
defendant may be fined an additional $5,000, or sen-
tenced to an additional five years' incarceration, or both. 
As in Rhode Island, the enhanced sentences in Loui-
siana run consecutively. A defendant convicted of a mis-
demeanor, which usually permits a maximum sentence of 
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up to one year's incarceration, can be sentenced to up to 
18 months. However, the criminal degree is not enhanced 
to a felony. As noted above, there is no consensus . over 
how the enhancement statute affects subject-matter juris-
diction. It is unclear if a lower criminal court judge, with 
jurisdiction limited to misdemeanors, would still have 
subject-matter jurisdiction if the misdemeanor had a 
maximum possible sentence of more than one year, which 
is typically felony-only territory. 
We also place statutes that mandate collateral punish-
ments into Subtype 2.3. Collateral punishments are penal-
ties other than incarceration. The most common collateral 
punishments for hate or bias-related crimes are fines and 
reparations, community service, and participation in di -
versity programs. Most of the jurisdictions which have en-
acted these collateral punishments have tied them to spe-
cific intimidation and harassment crimes. However, a few 
have tied the collateral punishments to all, or almost all, 
hate or bias-related crimes. 
California has two statutes that allow or mandate 
community service as an additional punishment for peo-
ple convicted of bias-related crimes. One of these is related 
to specific intimidation acts that are intended to interfere 
with the rights of others and motivated by the victim's 
characteristics. California also has a catch-all statute au-
thorizing the court to "order a defendant who is convicted 
of a hate crime to perform a minimum of community ser-
vice, not to exceed 400 hours, co be performed over a pe-
riod not to exceed 350 days."6° California separately de-
fines hate crime to mean "a criminal act committed, m 
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whole or in part, because of one or more of the following 
actual or perceived characteristics of the victim: (1) dis-
ability, (2) gender, (3) nationality, (4) race or ethnicity, (5) 
religion, (6) sexual orientation, or (7) association with a 
person or group with one or more of these actual or per-
ceived characteristics."61 Any crime that falls under the 
definition of hate crime may, at the judge's discretion, be 
subject to the community service punishment. 
When an enhancement increases incarceration, the 
enhancement can affect plea bargaining. A defendant will 
be unable to receive certain promises when pleading if that 
plea is to a hate or bias-related crime. Mandatory mini-
mums or mandatory additional incarceration time can limit 
what penalty can be agreed to in exchange for a guilty plea. 
Furthermore, on exercising enhancement discretion, a judge 
might negate a plea with an agreed-upon punishment if 
that plea is to a hate crime. 
Laws mandating or permitting collateral punishments 
are discussed more extensively in the next section. How-
ever, practitioners in jurisdictions with laws similar to Cal-
ifornia's must be aware of the possibility of a community 
service penalty. A client in California might be less willing 
to plead guilty when the prosecutor has promised to rec-
ommend no jail time if he is aware that the sentence might 
include up to 350 hours of community service. 
Subtype 2.4: Add jail time or other consequences for 
crimes involving harassment or intimidation 
Laws falling into this subcategory are very similar to 
those in Subtype 2.3. The statutes are just as varied. Some 
statutes increase the mandatory or possible incarceration 
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period for hate or bias-related crimes. Some mandate fines 
or reparations, community service, or attendance at di-
versity programs. The key distinction between this sub-
category and Subtype 2.3 is that the underlying acts and 
crimes in this category are closely related to harassment 
or intimidation. This narrower view of applicable crimes 
ensures that the requisite motive is a more traditional 
"hatred," as opposed simply to bias. None of these pen-
alty enhancements change the criminal degree of the un-
derlying crime. 
One of Nevada's hate-crime statutes increases the pen-
alty for certain crimes committed with a bias motive. The 
statute lists ten specific crimes to which it applies, ranging 
from kidnapping to sexual assault to "mayhem" (disfigur-
ing another person). The statute applies if the defendant 
willfully commits any of the listed crimes "because the ac-
tual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, 
physical or mental disability or sexual orientation of the 
victim was different from that characteristic of the perpe-
trator."62 The statute allows for an increased and consecu-
tive sentence of one to 20 years' incarceration. 
Colorado has an interesting sentencing structure 
related to collateral punishments. It is not technically an 
enhancement, but it does provide for punishments addi-
tional to the sentence for the underlying crime. The stat-
ute states that the alternative sentences provided for "shall 
be in addition to and not in lieu of any other sentence re-
ceived by the offender."63 However, these alternatives are 
for a first time bias-crime offender, and the language 
seems to suggest that the underlying penalty will be 
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reduced if these alternatives are used. The statute permits 
the judge to consider sentencing the defendant to "useful 
community service intended to benefit the public and 
enhance the offender's understanding of the impact of the 
offense upon the victim," or to refer the case to some 
form of restorative justice dispute resolution program.64 
The restorative justice program can be imposed only if it 
is requested by the victim. The Colorado law allows for a 
resolution focusing on restorative and rehabilitative con-
cerns. Collateral punishments can be a definite aid for 
defense attorneys seeking to get lenient sentences for a cli-
ent who might otherwise face a stiff prison sentence for 
committing a hate crime. 
Massachusetts has a more direct form of the collateral 
punishment scheme. The state makes it a new crime to com-
mit an assault or battery upon a person, or damage the prop-
erty of that person, "with the intent to intimidate such person 
because of such person's race, color, religion, national origin, 
sexual orientation, or disability."65 A conviction under this · 
statute comes with collateral punishments. One is an addi-
tional fine, which helps fund the state's Diversity Awareness 
Education Trust Fund. The defendant is also required to com-
plete a diversity awareness program while incarcerated or 
while on probation. Furthermore, "the court may also order 
restitution to the victim in any amount up to three times the 
value of property damage." These potentially substantial 
fines may be sticking points for defendants considering tak-
ing a plea, especially poor clients, who might not have the 
money, or clients who hold strong emotions about the situa-
tion, who might object to giving money to the victim. 
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Type 3: Aggravating Factors 
Another type of sentence-related law for bias-related 
crimes lists bias as an aggravating sentencing factor. Ag-
gravating factors don't change the level of crime and they 
don't mandate that the defendant receive an enhanced 
penalty. Aggravating factors simply serve as guides to in-
form judges that the legislature believes that harsher pen-
alties, within a statutorily allowed range, are appropriate 
under these circumstances. 
While non-binding for sentencing, these statutes can be 
important. One aggravating factor can often be the differ-
ence between no jail time and incarceration. For the most 
serious crimes, an aggravating factor can be the difference 
between incarceration and the death penalty.66 Further-
more, sentencing ranges are often broad. An aggravating 
factor can mean a difference of years in prison for a defen-
dant. An aggravating factor can also be used by a sentencing 
judge to lengthen other penalties, such as probation. 
Some aggravating factor laws apply to all, or most, 
crimes, and others apply only to specific crimes (which 
usually involve harassment or intimidation). We classify 
statutes that allow for bias to be an aggravating factor for 
all, or almost all, crimes as Subtype 3.1. Statutes which 
limit the crimes the law applies to are referred to as Sub-
type 3.2. Because there is no significant difforence be-
tween the ways the two types of statutes are structured, 
we discuss the two subtypes together. 
West Virginia's statute authorizing the use of bias as 
an aggravating factor is one of the most direct approaches: 
"the fact a person committed a felony or misdemeanor, 
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or attempted to commit a felony, because of the victim's 
race, color, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation 
or sex, shall be considered a circumstance in aggravation 
of any crime in imposing sentence."67 
Other states have slightly less direct statutes that none-
theless have the same effect. These usually list bias as one 
of a number of aggravating factors. For example, a sub-
section of the Kansas law reads: "the following nonexclu-
sive list of aggravating factors may be considered in deter-
mining whether substantial and compelling reasons for 
departure exist." The third item on the list is that "the of-
fense was motivated entirely or in part by the race, color, 
religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of 
the victim or the offense was motivated by the defen-
dant's belief or perception, entirely or in part, of the race, 
color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orien-
tation of the victim whether or not the defendant's belief 
or perception was correct."68 For purposes of the statute, -
"departure" means a sentence other than the presumptive 
sentence for a particular crime. 
It is unlikely that the statute dealing with aggravating 
factors will use the word "bias" in either its title or short 
summary. Most statutes are structured like Kansas's, 
where bias is merely included in a laundry list of aggra-
vating factors. 
Kentucky is an example of a jurisdiction limiting the 
crimes for which bias can be an aggravating factor. The 
law has a short list of substantive offenses, including 
assault, arson, and harassment. The statute states "a 
person may be found by the sentencing judge to have 
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committed [one of the listed offenses] as a result of a 
hate crime if the person intentionally [commits any of 
the listed crimes] because of race, color, religion, sexual 
orientation, or national origin of another individual or 
group of individuals"69 The statute directs the sentenc-
ing judge to "determine if, by a preponderance of the 
evidence presented at the trial, a hate crime was a 
primary factor in the commission of the crime by the 
defendant." A determination that a hate crime was a 
primary factor "may be utilized by the sentencing judge 
as the sole factor for denial of probation, shock probation, 
conditional discharge, or other form of non-imposition 
of a sentence of incarceration." 7° Finally, the hate crime 
determination can also be used by a parole board in 
delaying or denying parole. 
Kentucky provides an example of an aggravating fac-
tor statute that is limited and highly expansive at the 
same time. The statute is obviously limited in that it ap-
plies to only 28 statutes, which are basically various lev-
els of eight to 10 substantive crimes. The statute is also 
broad in that it specifically declares a wide range of nega-
tive consequences a defendant can be subject to if it is de-
termined that the crime was prompted by bias. 
Type 4: Specific Hate- or Bias-Related Acts 
The final category of hate-crime laws includes highly 
specific crimes. These crimes generally do not require any 
bias- or hate-related subjective motivation. However, some 
of these laws are so specialized and specific that they are 
usually applicable only to acts committed for those rea-
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sons. This category includes actions like putting a burning 
cross on an African-American's property or branding a 
Jewish person's house with a swastika. 
This category also includes a general desecration sub-
type. Desecration is frequently outlawed in state criminal 
codes. This type of law prohibits damaging a number of 
different things, varying from state to state, which are re-
vered by members of the public. The most commonly 
protected are places of worship, cemeteries, and flags. We 
have included desecration as a subtype because of the 
protections of places of worship and, in some cases, reli-
gious symbols. Defacement of these often stem from hate 
or bias. 
Note that all of these statutes need to be carefully 
worded to avoid running afoul of the First Amendment.71 
The statutes need to be geared toward preventing certain 
harms, as opposed to preventing disfavored speech. 
Subtype 4.1: Prohibit displaying symbols of hate or bias 
Laws in this subtype prohibit actions even more spe-
cific than the laws in the subtypes prohibiting intimida-
tion or harassment hate-crimes. The statutes list highly 
specific acts and sometimes apply only if that act is taken 
against a victim who has one particular characteristic. 
The most general form of this kind of law can be 
found in North Carolina. A state statute prohibits placing 
an object or exhibit to intimidate another person: "it shall 
be unlawful for any person to place or cause to be placed 
anywhere in this State any exhibit of any kind whatsoever . 
.. with the intention of intimidating any person or persons, 
or of preventing them from doing any act which is lawful, 
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or of causing them to do any act which is unlawful."72 
The statute explicitly notes that exhibit includes items 
such as a noose. No bias motivation is required to violate 
this law. 
A subsection of a statute in Washington shows how 
narrow this type of statute can be. The state has a more 
general hate-crime statute, making it a crime to "mali-
ciously and intentionally" cause physical injury to a per-
son, damage property or threaten a person because of the 
defendant's perception of the victim's characteristics. How-
ever, a subsection of that law explicitly states that this stat-
ute applies if the defendant "burns a cross on property of a 
victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African 
American heritage" or "defaces property of a victim who 
is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by 
defacing the property with a swastika." 73 
This subsection makes Washington's statute notable, 
because these two acts stand apart from all of the other 
actions that might constitute a violation of this statute. 
The state singled out these two acts to permit a shift in 
the burden of proof. In any case involving cross burning 
or swastika branding, "the trier of fact may infer that the 
person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of 
victims because of the person's perception of the victim's 
[characteristics]." This shifts a part of the burden of proof 
on the element of malicious intent. As of yet, this provi-
sion shifting the burden of proof has not been constitu-
tionally challenged, but it seems unlikely that shifting the 
burden of proof on an element of the crime to a criminal 
defendant will withstand constitutional scrutiny.74 
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Subtype 4.2: Desecration 
The final type of hate-crime statute is desecration, 
sometimes referred to as institutional vandalism. Dese-
cration statutes generally protect against defacement or 
destruction of venerated objects. These objects include 
cemeteries, flags, and places of worship, and sometimes 
other things as well. We include desecration statutes be-
cause the harm that they protect against is usually closely 
related to a group's shared and central characteristic, 
such as religion . Crimes against venerated objects are 
often intended to harass, annoy, or intimidate people 
with that characteristic. Note, however, that these laws 
almost never require proof of bias or hate against the 
group the desecration harms.75 These statutes usually 
make it a new crime to harm these protected objects for 
any reason. States without general hate or bias laws often 
still have a desecration statute. 
One such jurisdiction is Arkansas, which has two des-
ecration statutes but no hate- or bias-related criminal stat-
ute. One of its statutes prohibits desecrating any place of 
worship or burial.7~ The other prohibits desecrating any re-
ligious symbol that is an object of respect by at least a sub-
stantial segment of the public "with the purpose to cause 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly cre-
ating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm."n 
Ohio has a more specific desecration statute. The 
statute reads that "no person, without privilege to do so, 
shall purposely deface, damage, pollute, or otherwise 
physically mistreat" any cemetery, or any place of wor-
ship, its furnishings, or religious artifacts or sacred texts 
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within the place of worship or within the grounds upon 
which the place of worship is located, or any other object 
of reverence or sacred devotion." 78 No bias motivation is 
necessary to commit this crime. 
Illinois' desecration statute is one of the few requiring 
a bias motivation. The institutional vandalism statute is 
violated if the person "knowingly and without consent in-
flicts damage to . . . a church, synagogue, mosque, or other 
building, structure or place used for religious worship or 
other religious purpose ... a cemetery, mortuary or other 
facility used for the purpose of burial or memorializing 
the dead" or grounds adjacent to those places and owned 
or rented by them, or any personal property contained in 
those places.79 What distinguishes Illinois' statute is that 
the crime must be motivated "by reason of the actual or 
perceived race, color, creed, religion or national origin of 
another individual or group of individuals, regardless of 
the existence of any other motivating factor or factors." 
Desecration elements can also be used to redefine 
other crimes. South Carolina, for example, applies dese-
cration language to its arson statute, in addition to hav-
ing a standard desecration statute. The state's arson stat-
ute declares that causing an explosion or fire in a "church 
or place of worship" is a higher level of arson than simply 
setting fire to a building. 80 
Finally, desecration laws often authorize collateral pun-
ishments. These collateral punishments are often contained 
within the desecration law itself, though they are some-
times found in a separate statute referring directly to the 
desecration law. Pennsylvania has a typical desecration 
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statute titled "Institutional Vandalism." The statute pro-
hibits, among other things, vandalizing, defacing, or 
damaging a "church, synagogue or other facility or place 
used for religious worship or other religious purposes ... 
[a] cemetery, mortuary or other facility used for the pur-
pose of burial or memorializing the dead ... the grounds 
adjacent to and owned or occupied by [the above men-
tioned places] .. . [and] any personal property located in 
[the above mentioned places]." 81 A provision elsewhere in 
the criminal code, declares that a person convicted of in-
stitutional vandalism "who in the opinion of the sentenc-
ing court would benefit, shall be sentenced to a term of 
supervised community service, including repairing or re-
storing damaged property."82 
VI: GENERAL ISSUES WHEN 
ENCOUNTERING HATE OR BIAS CRIMES 
Hate or bias-crime statutes are often confusing, making 
it difficult to know whether a hate crime even applies to a 
particular fact pattern, let alone what its implications 
might be. Many of the statutes are worded so broadly 
that the hate-crime law could apply to seemingly ridicu-
lous situations where obviously no "hate" exists. The 
financial crime prosecutions in Queens, New York, where 
defendants targeted elderly victims but obviously held no 
animus or hatred toward the elderly seems like a misap-
plication of a hate crime, yet the law was still effectively 
used by prosecutors. 
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Questions about how broad the application of hate-
crime statute can be are often not answered by even the 
legislative history. In Ca lifornia, for exa mple, a state sena-
tor posed various questions about the hate-crime statutes 
to the California Attorney General because there was no 
other way to determine the scope of the state's hate-crime 
laws. One of his questions was about the type of fact pat-
tern in Queens, where a victim was chosen for utilitarian 
means (because the victim was more vulnerable). 83 The 
California Attorney General decided that choosing a victim 
for utilitarian purposes was not a hate crime, but the an-
swer to the question was not contained in any of the stat-
utes or legislative history of California's hate-crime stat-
utes. The Attorney General himself needed to consult law 
dictionaries and other sources in an effort to construe on 
his own the meaning of various terms of the statutes. 
Almost every state's hate-crime laws are prone to con-
fusion. Finding the hate-crime law can be a cha llenge in it-
self. 84 The laws are often either buried in a laundry list 
statute with other regulations unrelated to bias-motivated 
acts, or must be pieced together using multiple statutes.85 
What facts the statute can apply to is almost never clear, 
especially when the statutes are broad. Laws like those in 
New York and California, outlawing "bias," can lead to 
the criminalization of a huge range of acts. The legislature 
in a particular state might call a particular law a "hate-
crime" law, but the actual language of the statute creates a 
possibility that the law will apply when no "hate" exists at 
all. These questions of application are often not answered 
by the statute. 
41 
CRIMINALIZING HATE 
Who makes the determination about whether a hate-
crime law applies, and when that decision should be made, 
are also unclear. The subtypes of laws that establish new, 
separate hate crimes, or increase the degree of the crime, 
always give prosecutors discretion to decide because the 
maximum possible sentence is increased. 86 The question 
of when the decision to apply a hate-crime statute takes 
place becomes murkier with aggravating factors and sen-
tencing enhancements. The statutes almost never say 
whether the prosecutor needs to specifically point out that 
the facts raise the inference of a hate motive, or whether 
the judge can decide on his own that hate was a factor. 
The statutes also are silent on whether the prosecutor 
needs to arraign the defendant in a way that brings up the 
hate motive or whether the prosecutor can just bring up 
facts about the hate motive later on at trial or sentencing. 
Some state judiciaries and legislatures have specifically an-
swered these questions, while others have not. 
What particular characteristics are protected seems 
unproblematic, but we believe that this is an area ripe for 
litigation. Almost all hate-crime statutes list the particu-
lar characteristics that trigger the hate crime law. These 
lists seem comprehensive. However, the sheer breadth of 
some of the statutes suggests that many state legislatures 
intended to combat all hate-based crimes. An ambitious 
argument would be that the failure to include a particular 
characteristic in the text of the statute does not mean that 
the legislature did not care about bias crimes against peo-
ple with that particular characteristic. The existence of a 
list could just represent that the legislature wanted merely 
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to provide examples of what characteristics were pro-
tected and what were not, not to the exclusion of all non-
listed characteristics. This argument could arise in regard 
to crimes against people with characteristics defendants 
might view negatively, but which are almost never listed 
in hate crime laws, such as obesity. 
Broad laws prohibiting crimes motivated by a person's 
characteristics, as opposed to laws which specifically state 
that they apply to crimes motivated by the victim's char-
acteristics, can theoretically be applied in ways most peo-
ple would consider odd. These laws are usually worded in 
this way to allow prosecutions of crimes motivated by bias 
against people the victim associates with. For example, if 
a non-Indian victim who associates with Indians is at-
tacked for that reason by a defendant who hates Indians, 
a broadly written law can apply. A narrower hate-crime 
law addressing bias against only the victim's characteris-
tics would not be usable in that situation. However, these 
broad laws also make possible the somewhat ridiculous 
hypotheticals, discussed earlier, in which the victim had 
no connection whatsoever to the defendant's bias. 
VII: CONCLUSION 
Hate-crime legislation comes in a huge variety of forms. 
Legislatures adjust their hate- crime statutes frequently in 
an attempt to stay in step with constantly evolving social 
norms. States approach the issue with different goals and 
in different social climates, and hate-crime statutes reflect 
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the diversity of American social norms. Furthermore, one 
highly publicized event might spur a particular state to 
update or modify its hate-crime law. 
We classify hate crime laws into four categories -
creation of a new crime, sentence enhancement, sentence en-
hancement with aggravating factors, and narrow hate-re-
lated acts - and each category has potential opportunities 
and traps. 
The charts at pp. 50ff. should provide a useful guide 
for practitioners, scholars, and others. The first chart 
cites and summarizes all of the current hate-crime stat-
utes in the United States, jurisdiction by jurisdiction. The 
second chart provides information on what particular 
characteristics are protected by each jurisdiction's law. 
While these summaries are useful guides, reading the 
statutes themselves is often the best way to understand 
how a legislature has decided to address this complex 
issue. All criminal statutes are publically available, and 
can usually be found simply by entering the law's citation 
into an Internet search engine. We encourage you to inves-
tigate these laws yourself. Hate crime is an area of statu-
tory law that is changing and evolving like few others, 
and is rich with interesting history and legislative intent. 
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1. Cla ims vary over the origins of the term " hate cr ime." Accord ing to 
Christopher Parr, The Maine Civil Rights Act: History, Enforce-
ment, Application. and Analysis, 53 ME. L. REV. 189 (2001), the 
term first appeared in a 1989 issue of U.S. News and World Report, 
in the ar ticle "The Po litics of Hate," by John Leo. James B. Jacobs 
and Kimberly Potter, in HAT E CR IM ES: CR IMIN AL LAW AND 
IDENTITY Pouncs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
sugges t that the term or igina ted in federal legis lation being drafted 
in 1985 in connection with the Justice Department's collec tion of 
" hate crime stati sti cs." Another account cred its the Ca li fornia 
Commiss ion on Rac ia l, Erhnic, Religious, and Minority Violence 
wi th coini ng the term in hearings beginning in 1980; see http:// 
www.cahro.org/html/origin_of_ hate_laws. html . 
2. 18 u.s.c. § 245( b)(2) (1968). 
3. H ate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999: Test imony on H .R. 1082 
before the House Comm . on the Judiciary, 106 th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Professor of Law, Boston 
University). See Todd Smith, Enhanced Punishment Under the 
Texas Hate Crimes Act: Politics, Panacea, or Pathway to Hell? 26 
ST. MARY'S L.J . 259, 265 (1994). 
4. See genera lly Terry A. Maroney, The Struggle Against Hate Crimes: 
Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564 (1998). 
5. 123 Srat. 2841(b)(l) (1990) (Hate Crimes Stat istics Act of 1990). 
6. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
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statutes a re unconsti tutiona l for First Amendment or vagueness 
reasons. For example, in Illinois and Maryland, see People v. Nitz, 
285 Ill. App. 3d 364 (3rd Dist. 1996), and Ayers v. Stare, 335 Md. 
603 (1994). 
8. Section 280003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act o f 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). 
9. Federa l Sentencing Guidelines§ 3A1.l(a). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2009). The congress iona l findings indicated that 
the Act was needed to eliminate rhe "rel ics of slavery." 111 P.L. 84 
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authors is that this act was actua lly passed as a rider to the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 2010 (H.R. 2647; 111 P.L. 84). 
11. 18 u.s.c. § 249(b). 
12. " Remarks by the President at Reception Commemorating the 
Enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Cri mes Prevention Act" White House Press Release, Office of the 
Press Secretary, October 28, 2009. 
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13. U.S. Dept. of Justice-FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: HATE CRIME 
STATISTICS, 2009 (Released November 2010). While these are the 
most comprehensive statistics tracking hate crimes throughout the 
United States, reporting practices and other limitations keep these 
statistics from representing anywhere near all of the hate crimes in 
America. 
14. For example, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181k (2010). This law pre-
vents causing physical contact with another person with specific 
intent to intimidate or harass that person due to the person's 
characteristics. 
15. For example, the Utah hate crime statute applies if the offense is 
" likely to incite community unrest or cause members of the com-
munity to reasonably fear for their physical safety or to freely 
exercise or enjoy any right secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3 -203.4 (2011). Furthermore, many states crimi-
nalize interference with civil rights. Most of these statutes do not 
require a hate or bias motive, yet most are applied in circumstances 
similar to the circumstances which led to the 1969 federal hate 
crime statute. 
16. NY Penal Law§ 485.00 (2011). 
17. Jordan Blair Woods, Comment: Addressing Youth Bias Crime, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1899, 1916 (2009). 
18. Mitchell, 508 U.S . 476. 
19. Laura Pfeiffer, Note, To Enhance or Not to Enhance: Civil Penalty 
Enhancements for Parents of Juvenile Hate Crime Offenders, 41 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1685, 1722 (2007) ("Enhanced penalty statutes 
further protect the public via increased periods of incarceration. 
Such increases are necessary to promote a sense of security, and a re 
justified by a decrease in the social harms of retaliation, a break-
down in community cohesiveness, and disassociation among 
society." ) 
20. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, HATE CRIMES: CAUSES, CONTROLS AND 
CONTROVERSIES (Sage Publications, 2010). 
21. Id. at 23. As discussed later, hate crime laws are often difficult for 
even lawyers to find and decipher. 
22. Kenworthey Bilz and John M. Darley, Symposium: "Law &": 
Philosophical, Psychological, Linguistic, and Biological Perspectives 
on Legal Scholarship: IV. Law and Psychology: What's Wrong with 
Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1215 
(2004). 
23. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9720 (2010). 
24. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3807 (2010) (Accelerated Rehabilitative 
Disposition Program). 
25 . C.R.S. 18-9 -121(3.5) (2010). 
26. CA Pen. Code § 422.86(a)(3) (2010). 
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27. § 720 ILCS 5/12-71 (20 !0). 
28. In a way, the ac ru a l crim ina l ac t (for exa mple, "harassment by tele-
phone") becomes a lesse r included cha rge of the cha rged cr ime of 
" ha rassment by telephone as a ha re crime". Therefore, under the 
merger doctrine, a defend anr likely ca nno t be convicted o f both 
" ha rassment by telephone" a nd "h arassment by telephone as a hate 
crime." Block burger v. United Sca tes, 284 U.S . 299 (1 932). However, 
a defend a nr cha rged with " ha rassment by telepho ne as a ha re 
crime" could still be convicted of " harassment by telephone" if the 
prosecutor fa il s to prove che hate crime elemenr beyond a reason-
able do ubt. 
29. § 720 ILCS 5/1 2-71(a). 
30 . While the autho rs have not fo und a case in which this face pa ttern 
has led to a hate crime prosecution , the fac t pattern is theoreti ca ll y 
poss ible under Ill ino is's statute a nd statutes like it. Tho ugh in 
a nother subtype fo r o ur pa per, consider statutes like the one in 
Deleware , in which se lecting the vict im beca use o f the victim 's 
charac teristi cs is what makes the statute a pplica ble, but bias aga inst 
that pa rti cular characteri sti c is not necessa ry. 11 Del. C. § 1304 (a) 
(2) (2010). 
31. MCL § 750. 147 b (2010). 
32. M CL § 750.147b. 
33. 18 USC § 249. 
34. For exa mple, a criminal compla int, an indi ctment or a prosec utor 's 
in fo rm ation. 
35. In New Yo rk , for exa mple, see People v. Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729 
(1986). O ther states have cases with simil ar holdings. 
36. See ALM GL ch. 265, § 37 (2010) (M assachu serrs). 
37. See Wyo. Stat. § 6-9-102 (2010). 
38. For exa mple, see Mississ ippi and Oklahoma's statutes. Miss. Code 
Ann § 97-25-17 (2010). 21 O ki. St . § 915 (2010). 
39. 5 M .R.S. § 4684-A (2010). This sta ture is in the " Human Rights" 
sec tion of M a ine's "Administra tive Procedu res and Services" scac-
uces (Title 5). 
40. 17 M .R.S. § 2931 (2010). This law is in the "Crimes" section of 
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41. 17 M .R.S. § 2932 (2010). 
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Positive Experiences and Possihle First Amendment Potholes, 61 
M E. L. R EV. 521, 522 (2009). 
43. 18 USC § 245. The rights a re genera l civil rights such a vo ting, 
attending court and enrolling in schoo l. T he charac terist ics pro-
tec ted a re basic (race, colo r, rel igion o r nationa l o rigin). 
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44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466 (2000). 
45 . Fla . Stat. § 775.085 (2010). 
46. Fla . Stat. § 775.085(1}(a}(l}. 
47. State v. Hart, 677 So.2d 385 (Fla. 4th DCA, 1996). 
48. NY Penal Law§ 485.05 (2010). 
49. Anne Barnard, "A Novel Twist for the Prosecution of Hate 
Crimes," NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/ 
nyregion/23hate.html?_r=l&ref=hate_crimes, published June 22, 
2010. 
50. 11 Del. C. § 1304 (2010). 
51. See NY CPL § 10.20-10.30 (2010). 
52. Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2009). 
53. Minn. Stat.§ 609.749(3}(a}(l) (2009). 
54. Minn. Stat. § 609.595(1a)(a) (2009). 
55. R.R.S. Neb. § 28-111 (2010). 
56 . R.R.S. Neb. § 28-112 (2010). 
57. R.I. Gen. Laws§ 12-19-38 (2010). 
58. La. R.S. 14:107.2 (2010). 
59. La . R.S. 14.54.1 (2010). While we have been unable to find any 
cases of Louisiana 's applying its hate-crime law to this crime, its 
mere inclusion shows how expansive the potential application of 
the hate-crime law is. 
60. Cal. Pen. Code § 422 .77 (2009). 
61. Cal. Pen. Code § 422 .55 (2009). 
62. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193.1675 (2010). 
63. C.R.S. § 18-9-121. 
64. C.R.S. § 18-9-121(3.5). 
65. ALM GL ch. 265, § 39 (2010). 
66. For example, 11 Del. C. § 4209 (2010). 
67. W. Va . Code §61-6-21 (2010). 
68 . K.S.A. § 21-4716 (2009). 
69. KRS § 532.031 (2010). 
70. Note that since nothing in this statute increases the maximum pos-
sible incarceration sentence (every sentence must still fall within the 
statutorily defined sentence ranges, and these consequences deal 
with the minimum sentences a defendant might receive), Apprendi 
is not implicated. Thus, the hate factor may be determined by the 
judge to a preponderance of the evidence without violating a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment rights . Apprendi, supra note 44, at 466. 
71. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (2002). See also Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
72. N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 14-12.13 (2010). 
73. Rev. Code Wash. § 9A.36 .080 (2010). 
74. Due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
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358, 364 (1970). The Washington statute creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption against the defendant on the intent element, seemingly 
negating the need to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt . 
Furthermore, almost every model jury instruction reads that the gov-
ernment has the burden of proving every element of every charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including Washington's . Washington 
requires that a plea of not guilty "puts in issue every element of [the] 
[each] crime charged. The [State] [City] [County] is the plaintiff and 
has the burden of proving each element of [the] [each] crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt." 11 WASH. PRAC., PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 
WPIC 4.01 (3d Ed). This instruction is required in every criminal 
case in Washington. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn .2d 303 (2007). This 
seems to create a conflict between due process and the presumption 
of "intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims 
because of the person's perception of the victim's [characteristics] ." 
Rev. Code Wash. § 9A.36.080(2). Finally, the Supreme Court has 
specifically held that a similar provision in Virginia, where cross 
burning in general was prima-facie evidence of an intent to intimi-
date, was unconstitutional because it interfered with a defendant's 
constitutional right to not put on a defense. Black , supra note 71, 
at 365. 
75. As noted, this is probably in order to avoid violating the First 
Amendment. 
76. A.C.A. § 5-71 -215 (2010). 
77. A.C.A. § 5-71-207 (2010). 
78. ORC Ann. 2927.11 (2010). 
79. 720 ILCS 5/21-1.2. 
80. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-110 (2010). 
81. 18 Pa.C.S . § 3307 (2010). 
82 . 42 Pa .C.S . § 9720. 
83. 88 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 141 (2005). 
84. For example, see Arizona's laws making bias an aggravating factor. 
A.R.S. § 13-701 (2010). A.R.S. § 41-1750 (2010). Bias is buried in 
subsection (15) of § 13-701, among a list of aggravating factors, 
and the subsection does not actually list any protected charactens-
tics. That subsection then references§ 41-1750, which is the statute 
that actually lists the protected characteristics. 
85. Almost all of the hate crime laws in Subtype 1.3 are this way. The 
states will have one statute creating a civi l right to be free of hate 
crimes. The state will then have another statute, in an entirely dif-
ferent section of the state's laws, criminalizing violations of another 
person's general civil rights or right to be free of hate crimes. 
86. Under Apprendi, supra note 44, at 466, a fact that increases the 
maximum possible sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This makes it a prosecutorial decision because the burden of 
proving the fact is on the prosecutor. 
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A SYNOPSIS 
JURISDICTION I II Al E-CIU/\11: Sl Al UTES 
Fede ml • 18 use § 249 (2009) - new crime; prohibits 
ca using bodi ly inj ury, or attempting ro cause 
bodil y injury while using va rious weapons, 
because of victim's ac tu a l o r perce ived 
characteristics (Subtype 1.2) 
• 18 U.S.C. S 247 (2009)- prohibits desecrarion 
of religious property o r interfe rence with 
religious practice (S ubtype 1.3 a nd 4.2) 
• Sentencing Guideli ne SJA J.1 1 
Alabama • Code of Ala. S 13A-5-13 (2010) - sentencing 
enha ncement which imposes mandatory 
minimum for any crime which is motiva ted 
by victi m's ac tual or perceived characreri srics 
(Subtype 2 .3) 
• Code of Ala. § l JA-6-28 (2010) - includes 
cross burning with inrenr ro inrimidare any 
' 
person or g roup of persons (S ubtype 4.1) 
• Code of Ala . S 13A- 1 l -12 (20 10) - includes 
desec ration of a structure o r place of worship 
o r burial (Subtype 4.2) 
Alaska • Alaska Stat . S 12 .55.155 (2010)- aggrava ting 
sentencing facto r if defendant direc ted rhe 
conduct const ituting the offense nr a victim 
because of certain victim characteristics; also 
ma kes ir a n aggravating factor if defendant 
knew rhe victim was pa rticula rly vu lnera ble 
because of certain other victim chantcrerisrics 
(Subtype 3.1) 
• Alaska Star. S 11.76 .110 (20 10) - new crime; 
prohibits interference with rights gra nted by 
the cons titution or laws of rhe srare; nor 
directly ried ro bias (Subtype 1.3) 
Arizona • A.R .S. S 13-70 1 (20 10) - aggravating fac to r 
if crime was convicted o ut of malice towa rd 
vic tim because of victi m's ac tua l o r perceived 
identity in a g roup li sted in a nother srn rure 
(Subt ype 3.1) 
• A.R .S. S 41 -1750 (2010) - lists rhe groups rhnr 
aggravating factor sta ture applies ro 
• A.R.S. S 13-1707 (2010) - c ross burning with 
intent to intimidate any person o r g roup of 
persons (Subtype 4. 1) 
1~hl' rl:Jcra l Sl'Otl'ndn~ ~u iJdim: rl'~lHJin~ h•lft.' i;rimcii is an ;1Jm iniscrativc \."UJl', 1101 •' Sl;ltUtC, 
ur :ri.t1 ll has rhc dfc\.'.t of inL'.rC.':t!<!inµ du: pn.·1'umprivc sc:mcncc for any fc:dt·rnl aiml'. 
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ll IU\IJI< I l<l'\ i 11 \I I < I\ I\ l I 'I \I l 11' JUlti;l>ICTION I HATE-CRL\1E STATU I ES 
Arizona (continued) • A.R.S. S 13-1708 (2010) - burning any symbol 
other than a cross with intent to intimidate any 
person or group of persons (Subtype 4.1) 
Ca li fo rnia (continued) • Ca l. Pen. Code § 422.77 (2010) - judge has 
disc retion to order defend ant convicted of a 
lune crime to perform community service 
• A.R.S. S 13-1604 (2010) - includes desecration 
of any building, place or personal property 
used for religious purpose (Subtype 4.2) 
Arkansas • A.C.A. S 5-71-207 (2010) - disorderly conduct 
statute includes desecration of religious sym-
bols (Subtype 4.2) 
• A.C .A. S 5-71-215 (2010) - includes desecra-
tion of places of worship and cemeteries 
(Subtype 4.2) 
California •Cal. Pen. Code S 422.55 (2010) - list of rhe 
protected characteristics 
(S ubtype 2.3 ) 
• Cal. Pen. Code § 422 .85 (20 10) - judge has 
di sc retion ro ord er defendant convicred of a 
hare crime to complete sensiti vi ty cl ass and /or 
pay res titurion payments (S ubt ype 2.3) 
• Ca l. Pen. Code § 11 70.8 (20 10) - aggrava ting 
facto r if assa ult or ro bbery rook place when 
victim was in a place of worship (S ubtype 3.2) 
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 11413 (20 JO) - new crime 
tha t is higher level crime than a rson, which . 
includes church burning with intent to terrori ze 
or disregard of terrorizing (S ubtype 1.2) 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 422 .56 (2010) - defines terms 
used in the state's hare crime statutes 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 422.6 (2010) - new crime 
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 114·11 (2010) - includes placing 
symbols of hare, such as a noose or swastika , 
with the intent to terrorize another (Subtype 4.1) 
prohibiting harmful act against person or 
property, committed ro interfere with victim's 
rights, done in whole or in part because of 
the actual or perceived characteristics of the 
victim; mandatory community service for 
violations of this crime (Subtypes 1.3 and 2.4) 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 422 .7 (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement that increases potential incar-
ceration for any harmful act against person of 
property to interfere with rights, where the act 
is not covered under Section 422.6; makes 
crimes that are not punishable by imprisonment 
• Ca l. Pen. Code S ll41 2 (201 0)- new crime of 
interference with anorher's religious exercise 
(Subt ype l.3) 
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 302 (2010) - prohibits 
di sturbing, in certa in ways, assemblies fo r 
religious worship (Subtype 1. 3) 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 594.3 (20 10)- prohibits 
desec ration of places of religious w~rsh ip and 
of cemeteries; increases degree of crune if 
committed with intent to deter others from 
ex pressi ng religious beliefs (Subtype 4.2) 
punishable by imprisonment of up to one year 
(Subtype 2 .3) 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 422. 75 (2010) - sentencing 
• Ca l. Pen. Code S 3053.4 (2010) - allows fo r 
collateral punishments ro be required of a hare 
c rime defend ant when rh"' defend ant IS paro led 
enhancement, adds additional years of incar- (Subtype 2.3) 
cerarion for felonies that are hate crimes; also 
adds additional years for prior felony convic-
tions which the trier of fact determined were 
hate crimes (Subtype 2 .3) 
• Cal. Pen. Code 423 .2 (2010) - prohibits inter-
fering with specific civil rights (Subtype 1.3) 
• Cal. Pen. Code S 190.03 (2010) - requires 
that a defendant convicted of first-degree 
murder that is a hate crime be sentenced to 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
Colorado • C. R .. 18-9- 12 1 (20 10)- new crime which 
prohibits causing in jur y, p~operry damage 
o r placing another person in fea r of person 
or properr y damage, where act was ra ke_n . 
with intent ro intimidate or harass rhe v1cnm 
beca use of victim 's actual or perceived 
characteristic (Subrype 1. 2) 
• C. R.S. 18-9- 12 1 (3.5) - aurh orizes community 
service or a lrernarive d ispute resolution for 
defendants convicted of firsr hare crime 
(Subtype 2.4) (Subtype 2.4) 
•Cal. Pen. Code S 422 .76 (2010) - court can use 
fact that felony is a hate crime as an aggravating 
factor if Section 422.76 is not used (Subtype 3.1) 
• C. R.S . 18-9- 1 I3 (2010)- includes desecration 
of venerared objecrs, places of worship and 
places of buria l (S ubtype 4.2) 
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Connecticut • Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-181j (2010) - new crime 
which prohibits causing physical injury to victim 
because of victim's characteristics, with specific 
intent to intimidate or harass (Subtype 1.2) 
•Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-181k (2010) -
new crime which prohibits causing physical 
contact with victim, damaging victim's property 
or threatening to physically contact victim or 
damage victim's property, because of victim's 
characteristics and with specific intent to 
intimidate or harass (Subtype 1.2) 
District of Columbia • D.C. Code § 22-3701 (2010) - defines bias 
(continued) related crime as a designated act that demon-
strates a defendant 's prejudice based on the 
actual or perceived characteristics of the 
victim; defines designated act as an extensive 
list of crimes against person or property 
• D.C. Code S 22-3312.03 (2010) - prohibits 
wearing a hood or mask in public places or 
when holding a meeting with the intent to 
intimidate, harass, cause fear or interfere with 
the rights of a person (Subtype 1.3) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-181l (2010) -
new crime prohibiting damaging any property 
with intent to harass another person , because 
of that person's characteristics (Subtype 1.2) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(a) (2010) -
new crime which prohibits interfering with 
victim's rights because of the victim's charac-
teristics (Subtype 1.3) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(b) (2010) - includes 
desecration of religious objects or symbols, 
places of worship and cemeteries (Subtype 4.2) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(c)-(d) (2010) -
• D.C. Code S 22-3312.02 (2010) - includes a 
prohibition against damaging any symbol used 
for religious or burial services, or_ us_ed by peo-
pie sharing a particular charac_temncs; one 
prohibited intent is related to rnnm1danon or 
interference with rights (Subtype 4.1) 
Delaware • 11 Del. C . § 1304(a)(l) (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement if any substantive crime was 
committed to interfere with the victim's rights 
increases the level of the underlying crime for 
a ll but the most serious felonies ; for most 
serious felonies, the minimum sentence of 
imprisonment is doubled (Subtype 2.3) 
prohibits cross burning (Subtype 4.1) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 46a-58(d) (2010) - prohibits 
placing a noose with the intent to intimidate or 
harass based on the target's characteristics 
(Subtype 4 .1 ) 
• 11 Del. C. S 1304(a)(2) (2010) - s~nte~cing 
enhancement if any substannve crime 1s 
committed where the victim was selected 
because of the victim's characteristics; increases 
the level of the underlying crime for all but the 
most serious felonies; for most serious felonies, 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-40a (2010) - sentenc-
ing enhancement which increases degree of 
the minimum sentence of imprisonment is 
doubled (Subtype 2.1 and 2.3) 
certain bias related crimes if the defendant has 
previously been convicted of a bias related 
crime (Subtype 2.2) 
• 11 Del. C. S 1301 (2010) - new c~ime pro_hibiting 
congregating in a public place whde wearing 
hoods, in a manner likely to deprive others of 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53-37a (2010) - new crime 
prohibiting violating any provision of Section 
46a-58 while wearing a hood or mask , with 
intent to deprive target or victim of rights 
because of victim's characteristics (Subtype 
1.3) 
rights (Subtype 1.3) 
• 11 Del. C. S 805 (2010)- prohibits burning 
religious symbols without permission of the owner 
of the property where rhe sym~ol is burnt and 
without advance notice to officials tn the county 
where the burning is to take place (Subtype 4.1) 
• Conn. Gen. Stat. S 54-56e(c) (2010) - prohibits 
diverting defendants charged with hate crimes 
into an accelerated pretrial rehabi litation 
program (Subtype 2.4) 
• 11 Del. C. S 1331 (2010) - includes desecr~tion 
of places of worship and objects of veneration, 
when done in a public place and ma way the actor 
knows is likely to outrage observers (Subtype 4.2) 
District of Columbia • D.C . Code S 22-3703 (2010) - sentencing 
en hancement for bias related designated acts, 
as defined in Section 22-3701; maximum fine 
and maximum incarceration both increased by 
1-~ times the normal maximum (Subtype 2.3) 
• 11 Del. C. § 4209 (2010) - lists bia~ motive and 
interference with righrs as aggravating factors 
when deciding whether a defendant convicted of 
first-degree murder should be sentenced to death 
(Subtype 2.4) 
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Florida • Fla. Srar . S 775.085 (20 10) - pena lry enha nce-
menr which increases rhe degree of a ny crime 
Hawa ii (co 11tim1cd) • HRS § 846-51 (2010) - defines rerm s used in 
the state's hate crime sta tures 
if rhe commission of rhe crime ev idences 
prej udice based on rhe charac rerisrics of rhe 
vicrim (Subrype 2.1) 
• Fhi. Srar. § 775 .0845 (2010) - pena lry enhance-
menr which increases rhe deg ree of any crime 
if rhe defend ant wore a hood or mask while 
committing rhe c rime; nor ried ro bias 
• Fla. Srar. § 876 .17 (2010) - prohibits burning 
• HRS § 71 1-1107 (2010) - includes desecrarion 
of a place of worsh ip or buria l, or of a an 
objecr of venerarion (S ubtype 4.2) 
Idaho •Idaho Code § 18-7902 (2010) - new crime 
prohibiting causing physical injury or damaging/ 
defacing a ny person's property, or threaten ing ro 
injure or damage, in order ro inrimidare or hara ss 
rhe victim because of the victim's charncrerisrics; 
a cross in a public place (S ubrype 4 .1) defines "deface" ro include placing symbols like 
• Fla. Srar. § 876 .18 (2010) - prohibits burning 
burning crosses (Subtype 1.2 and 4.1) 
a cross on private property wi th out rhe owner's 
permission (Subtype 4.1) 
•Idaho Code § 18-7903 (2010) - defines pena lr y 
for violarions of Sec ri on 18-7902 
•Fla. Srar. § 806.13 (2010) - includes clesecra rion Illinois • 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1 (2010)- new crime of 
of any place of worship or religious article 
conra ined in a place of worship (Su brype 4.2) 
• Fla . Srar. S 775.0861 (2010) - pena lry enh ance-
menr which increases rhe degree of a crime 
involving physica l force against a person if 
rhe c rime was committed on rhe property of a 
religious insrirurion whi le rhe vicrim is on rhe 
commitring one of a number of subsranrive crin~es 
beca use of rhe acrua l or perceived characremncs 
of an individua l or group of individual s; crime 
ca n be of a grearer degree if defendanr is convicred 
of rhis srarure afrer previously being convicred 
of ir or because rhe crime was commirred in a 
p lac~ of worship or place of buria l (Subtype 1.2) 
property ro attend or pa rticipa re in religious • 720 ILCS 5/12-7.l(b- !O) (2010) - penalry 
services (S ubtype 2.2) enhancement for viol:uion of hare crime srnrure 
Georgi;1 • O.C.G.A. § 17-10-17 (2010) - aggravnring fac ror 
if rhe rrier of facr derermines rhar rhc defendanr 
selecred victim or vicrim's properry beca use 
of bias or prejudice; srarure is worded like a 
senrencing enhancemenr, bur does nor allow 
which mandares eirher a fine or resriruri on; 
also srnres rhat any non-inca rcern ri on sentence 
for a hare crime convicrion will include 
communiry serv ice (Subrype 2.4) 
• 730 I LCS 5/5-5-3.2 (2010) - aggrava ting facror 
sentences beyond rhe normal srarurory maxi-
mum for an underlying offense (Subrype 3.1) 
• O.C .G .A. S 17-10-18 (2010) - defines when 
notice of prosecuroria l inren r ro seek enha nced 
penalry musr be given 
• O.C.G .A. § 16-11-37 (2010) - prohibits 
burning a sy mbol wirh an inrenr ro rerrorize 
(Subtype 4.1) 
• O.C.G.A. S 16 -7-26 (2010) - desecrarion of 
if defendanr commirred an offense by reason 
of the acrua l or perceived characrerisrics of rhe 
victim, an associate or friend of rhe vi~rim , o r ~ 
relarive of rhe vicrim; for age a nd physica l hand1-
cap, no bias morive is necessary (Subrype 3. 1) 
• 720 JLCS 5/21-1.2 (2010)- includes desecration 
of places of worship, cemeteries or places used 
ro memorialize rhe dead, by reason of rhe 
acrua l or perceived characrerisrics of a person 
or group of people (S ubrype 4.2) 
places of worship (S ubrype 4.2) 
Hawaii •HRS S 706-662 (2010) - senrencing enha nce-
menr aurhorized if rhe defendanr inrenriona lly 
selecred rhe vicrim or rhe properry damaged 
because of hosriliry roward rhe acru a l or 
Indiana •Ind . Code Ann. § 35-43-1-2 (2010) - new 
crime prohibirs damaging p~operty if rha r 
properry is a place of worship or 1f the damage 
was done ro impair rhe righrs of another 
person (S ubrype 1.3 and 4.2) 
perceived characre risrics of a ny pe rson; 
felonies on ly (S ubtype 2.1) 
•HRS S 706-661 (2010) - defi nes what the 
increased maximum sentences are if rhe sentenc· 
ing enhancemenr from Secrion 706-662 applies 
Iowa •Iowa Code S 729A.2 (2010) - sra~u re defining 
hate crime to mea n crimes comm med aga tnsr a 
person or properry because of rhe victim's. . 
charac rerisrics or because of rhe cha racrensncs 
of a person rhe vicrim associates with 
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Iowa (continued) •Iowa Code S 712.9 (2010) - penalty enhance-
ment which increases the degree of the arson 
related crimes which are also a hate crime 
Louisiana •La. R.S. 14:107.2 (2010) - sentencing enhance-
menr fo r extensive li st of substantive offenses 
which adds additional incarceration time 
under Section 729A.2 (Subtype 2 .2) 
• Iowa Code S 716 .6A (2010) - penalry enhance-
ment which increases the degree of vandalism 
crimes which are also a hate crime under 
and fin es if victim was selec ted because of the 
vic tim 's actual o r perceived charac teristics or 
rh e victim's actual or perceived association 
with an organization (Subtype 2 .3) 
Section 729A.2 (Subtype 2.2) 
• Iowa Code S 716.8 (2010) - penalty enhance-
ment which increases the degree of trespass if 
the trespass is done with the intent to commit a 
hate crime under Section 729A.2 (Subtype 2 .2) 
•Iowa Code S 708 .2C (2010) - new crimes of 
assault in violation of individual rights 
(Subtype 1.3) 
•La. R.S . 14 .225 (2010) - includes desecration 
of places of worship and places used to bury 
or memoria lize the dead (Subtype 4.2) 
Maine • 17 M.R.S. § 2931 (2010) - new crime 
prohibiting interfering with the rights of 
another person (S ubtype 1.3) 
• 17 M.R. S. § 2932 (2010) - sets penalty for 
viol:ition of Section 17-2931 
•Iowa Code S 729.5 (2010) - new crime of act-
ing or conspiring to interfere with another 
person's rights, or gathering to teach methods 
of interfering with rights; no bias required 
• 5 M.R.S. § 4684-A (2010) - establishes right 
to be free of violence, property damage or 
tres pass motivated by characterisrics; specifi -
ca lly refe rs to Section 17-2931 
(Subtype 1.3) 
• I7-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2010)- aggravating 
Kansas • K.S .A. § 21-4716 (2009) - aggravating factor 
if victim was selected or offense was motivated 
factor if selection of the person or properry 
was because of the cha racteristics of the victim 
because of the characteristics of the victim, (Subtype 3 .1 ) 
whether or not the victim actually had the 
characteristic; if found, judge can depart 
from presumptive sentence set by sentencing 
• 17-A M.R.S. § 507 (20 10)- includes desec ration 
of any place of worship or buria l (Subtype 4.2) 
guidelines (Subtype 3.1) 
• K.S.A. S 21-4003 (2009) - new crime of denial 
of civil rights to another based on the other's 
characteristics (Subtype 1.3) 
Maryland •Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann . § 10-306 
(2010) - states th at violations of Se_ctions 
10-302 through '10 -306 a re new cnmes, and 
sets the penalties for violating rhose statutes 
• K.S .A. S 21-4111 (2009) - includes desecration 
of any place of worship or place of burial 
(Subtype 4.2) 
Kentucky • KRS S 532.031 (2010) - aggravating factor 
•Md. CRIMI NAL LAW Code Ann . S W-3 07 
(2010) - permits the pena lty for violanons of 
Sec tions 10-302 through 10-306 to run consec-
utively with other crimes based_ on the act that 
led to the violation of thnr secnon 
if defendant committed specific crimes inten-
tionally because of the characteristics of 
another individual or group of individuals 
(Subtype 3.2) 
• Md . CRIMI NAL LAW Code Ann. S 10-301 
(2010) - defines the characteri stics used for rhe 
state's bia s crime statures 
• KRS S 525.113 (2010) - desecration of any 
object defined in Section 525.110, because of 
the characteristics of another individual or 
group of individuals (Subtype 4.2) 
• KRS S 525.110 (2010) - objects include places 
•Md. CRIMINA L LAW Code Ann . S 10-3 04 
(2010) - new crime if defend ant commirs or 
attempts ro commit any crime against or 
damages th e property of a person becm~ se of 
the person's characteristics; pr~perty cnmes 
based on ownership by the v1crim (Subtype 1.1 ) 
of worship and religious symbols • Md . CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann . S 10-305 
(20 I 0) - new crime prohibiting property cn_mes 
based on the characteristics of people assoc•-
ated wirh the pro perry (Subtype 1.1 ) 
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Maryland (continued) • Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. S 10-303 
(2010) - new crime prohibiting obstructing 
another person from the free exercise of that 
person's religious beliefs (Subtype 1.3) 
• Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. § 10-302 
(2010) - includes desecration of a place of 
worship or cemetery (Subtype 4.2) 
Massachusetts • ALM GL ch . 265, S 39 (2010) - new crime of 
Mississippi • Miss. Code Ann. S 99-19-301 (2010) - penalty 
enhancement for felony or misdemeanor if the 
crime was committed because of the actual 
or perceived characteristics of the victim 
(Subtype 2.3) 
•Miss. Code Ann. S 99-19-305 (2010) -
sets procedure and specific elements which 
much be used by the trier of fact when deciding 
whether a crime was committed because of the 
committing an assault or battery, or damaging 
a person's property, with the intent to intimi-
date the victim, because of the victim's 
characteristics; allows judge to order restitu-
tion for property damage; requires that a 
conviction resu lt in the defendant paying an 
additiona l fine and completing a diversity 
actual or perceived characteristics of the victim 
• Miss . Code Ann. § 99-19-307 (2010) -
authorizes additional penalty if Section 
99-19-301 applies, which is a term of imprison-
ment up to twice the normal maximum and a 
fine up to twice the norma l maximum 
program (Subtype 1.2 and 2.4) • Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-303 (2010) -
• ALM GL ch . 265, S 37 (2010) - new crime of 
interference with rights; bias not required 
sets procedure for seek ing enhanced penalties 
under the hate crime statutes 
(Subtype 1.3) • Miss . Code Ann. § 99-19-351 (2010) -
• ALM GL ch. 266, S 127A (2010) - includes 
desecration of a place of worship or a place for 
burial or memoria lizing the dead (Subtype 4.2) 
• ALM GL ch . 266, S 98 (2010) - includes 
desecration of a place used for religious 
instruction (Subtype 4.2) 
Michigan • MCL S 750 .147b (2010) - new crime of 
causing physical contact with a person or 
penalty enhancement for any felony or 
misdemeanor if the crime was committed 
against a victim who is over sixty-five years 
old or who is disabled (Subtype 2 .3) 
• Miss. Code Ann. S 99-19-357 (2010) -
authorizes additional penalty if Section 99-19-357 
applies , which is a term of imprisonment up to 
twice the normal maximum and a fine up to 
twice the normal maximum 
damaging the property of a person, or threat-
ening to cause physical contact or damage 
property, because of that person's characteris-
tics, and with specific intent to intimidate or 
harass (Subtype 1.2) 
Minnesota • Minn. Stat. S 609. 749 (2009) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases level of the crime 
•Miss. Code Ann. S 97-17-39 (2010) - includes 
desecration of items or places used to bury or 
memorialize the dead , any items inside a place 
of worship, or any part of the property in these 
places (Subtype 4.2) 
• Miss. Code Ann S 97-25-17 (2010) - prohibits 
for harassment or stalking committed because 
of the victim's or another's actual or perceived 
disturbing a congregation of people who are 
assembled for religious worship (Subtype 1.3) 
characteristics (Subtype 2.2) 
Missouri • S 557.035 R.S.Mo. (2010) - sentencing 
• Minn. Stat. S 609.595 (2009) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases level of the crime 
enhancement which increases the level of spe-
cific crimes which are knowingly motivated 
for property crimes committed because of the 
victim's or another's actua l or perceived char-
because of the characteristics of the victim or 
victims; the underlying offense is charged 
acteristics (Subtype 2 .2) under this stature, so the statutory language 
• Minn. Stat. S 609.2231 (2009) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases level of the crime 
make this seem like a new crime (Subtype 2.2) 
• S 574.085 R.S.Mo. (2010) - includes desecra-
for assaults committed because of the victim's tion of a place of worship or a place used co 
or another's actual or perceived characteris- bury or memorialize the dead , or grounds 
tics; additional increase for two such assaults adjacent to and owned and rented by one 
within five years of each ocher (Subtype 2.2) of those places (Subtype 4.2) 
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Montana • Mont. Code Anno., § 45-5-222 (2010) - New Hampshi re • RSA 65 1 :6 (20 10) - penalry enhancement 
sentencing enhancement which adds additiona l 
yea rs incarceration to a lmost every crime if the 
cr ime was because of the victim's characteri s-
increasing the possible incarceration sentences 
if the defend ant was substa ntia ll y motivared ro 
commit the crime beca use of hostility towa rd 
rics (Subtype 2 .3) 
• Mont. Code Anno., S 46-1-401 (2010) -
the victim's charac teristics; also has enhance-
ment for crimes involving force against a person 
or financial theft where the defendant intend ed 
sets proced ure for determining if Section 
45-5-222 applies 
ro rake adva ntage of the victim 's vu lnerab ility 
due to age or disability (S ubtype 2.3) 
•Mont . Code An no., § 45-5-221 (2010) -
new crime of causing bodi ly injury or causing 
apprehension of bodily injury, or damagi ng or 
defacing property, because of a person's char-
acteristics and with intent to terrify, intimidate, 
threaten, harass, annoy or offend ; deface 
includes placing a symbol of hare like a burn-
ing cross (Subtype 1.2 and 4.1) 
New jersey • N.j. Stat. § 2C:16-l (2010) - new crime prohib-
iring the commission of an extensive li sr of under-
lying offenses with rhe purpose to intimidare, 
or knowmg rhar it would inrimidare, or which 
ca used the intimidation of rhe vic tim , beca use 
of the victim 's characterisrics; a llows inference 
rhar defendant selecting victim because of char-
ac teri srics meant tha t defendant in tended to 
Nebraska • R.R.S . Neb. § 28-111 (2010)- sentencing 
enhancement which increases the level of crime 
for specific c rimes committed aga inst a person 
or a person's property because of that person's 
clrnracrerisrics; excludes the highest level 
crimes (Subt ype 2.2) 
intimidate victim because of characteristics; a llows 
judge to impose collateral penalties such as diver-
siry t raining and fines (Subtype 1.1 and 2 .3) 
• N.J. Srar. S 2C:33-l 1 (2010) - new crime of 
placing a symbol on a variety of places rhar 
exposes others to a threat of violence; allows judge 
• R.R .S. Neb. § 28-115 (20'IO) - sentenc ing 
en hancement which increases rhe leve l of crime 
to impose collatera l penalties such as restitution 
and community serv ice (Subtype 4.1 and 2.4) 
fo r specific crimes commirred aga inst a person 
because that person is a pregnant woman; 
exclud es the highest level crimes (Subtype 2.2) 
• N .J . Srar. S 2C:33-9 (2010) - includes desecra-
rion of any symbol or place of wo rship, or of 
any place of buria l (Subtype 4 .2) 
• R.R.S. Neb. § 28-110 (2010) - esra blishes 
person's right ro be free of crimes committed 
because of his or her charac teristics 
New Mexico • N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-186-2 (2010) - defines 
crimes "motivated by hare" as the intent to 
commit a c rime because of rhe acrua l or 
• R.R.S. Neb. S 28-112 (2010) - sers procedures 
for alleging and proving bias crimes 
perceived characteristics of rhe victim, as well 
as rhe mea ning of certain characterisrics 
Nevada • Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann . S 193.1675 (2010) -
sentencing enhancement which adds additiona l 
incarceration rime for spec ific crimes commirred 
because rhe acru a l or perceived characteristics 
of rhe victim was different than rhar characteris-
tic of the perpetrator (Subtype 2.4) 
• N .M. Star. Ann. § 31-18B-3 (2010) - sentencing 
en hancemenr which add addiriona l years incar-
cerarion for felonies morivared by hare, and 
a llows co llatera l penalties such as community 
service and ed uca tion fo r both felonies and 
misdemeanors motivated by hare (S ubtype 2.3) 
• Nev. Rev. Star. Ann. § 207.185 (2010) -
new crime prohibiting violating any provision 
of spec ific crimes by reason of rhe actu a l or 
• N.M. Star. Ann. S 31 -ISB-4 (2010) - prohibits 
desecration of a church; has been interpreted ro 
mean any place of worship (Su btype 4.2) 
perceived charac teristics of another person 
or group of peop le (Subtype 1.2) 
New York . Y CLS Penal S 485.05 (2010) - defines 
committing a hare crime as commirring an 
• Nev. Rev. Sntt. Ann. S 206 .125 (2010)-
includes desecration of any place of worship 
or place of burial or memoria li zing the dead, 
or of the grounds adjacent ro and ow ned or 
rented by any of those places (Subtype 4.2) 
incredibly ex tensive list of substa ntive offenses 
and in tentionally selecting the victim , or com· 
mitring the act or acrs, in whole or substantia l 
part because of a belief or perception regarding 
the characrerisrics of a person, regardless of 
whether the belief or perception is correct 
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New York (continu ed) • NY CLS Penal S 485.10 (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases the level of the 
underlying crime if it is a hare crime for a ll 
North Caro lina • N .C. Gen Star.§ 14-12.14 (2010) - prohibits 
(co11ti11ued ) placing an intimidating symbol, whi le wearing 
a mask or hood , with rhe intention of intimi-
but the most serious felonies; for the serious daring a person or people, or to prevent them 
felonies, increases the incarceration time from doing something h1wful or ro force rhem 
(Subtype 2 .1 and 2.3) ro do something unlawful (Subtype 4.1) 
•NY CLS Penal S 240.30 (2010) - new crime • N .C. Gen. Star. S 14-144 (2010) - includes 
which includes causing physical contact with a 
person, with intent harass, annoy, threaten or 
ha rming ;1 church or graveyard in a way other 
than burning (S ubtype 4.2) 
alarm, because of a belief or perception about 
that person's characteristics; is a higher level 
of harassment (Subtype 1.2) 
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-62.2 (2010) - prohibits 
burning a place of worship (Subtype 4.2) 
•NY CLS Penal S 240.31(2) (2010) - new crime 
which includes causing physical contact with a 
person , with intent harass, annoy, threaten or 
alarm, because of a belief or perception about 
thar person's characteristics, when defendant 
has been previously convicted of doing the 
same within a set amount of time; is a higher 
level of harassment (Subtype 1.2) 
• .C. Gen. Star. § 14-49 (20 10) - includes using 
an ex plosive to harm a place of worship; higher 
level crime than church burning (Subtype 4.2) 
• .C. Gen. Star.§ 14-12. 12 (20 10)- prohibits 
placing a burning cross on public property or 
with the intent ro intimidate or coerce a person 
(Subtype 4.1) 
•NY CLS Penal S 240.70 (2010) - prohibits 
inrerfering with another's right to religious 
worship (Subrype 1.3) 
• N.C. Gen. Star. § 14-199 (2010) - prohibits 
obstructing path ro a place of religious worship 
(S ubtype 1.3) 
•NY CLS Penal S 240.71 (2010) - prohibits 
interfering with another's right to religious 
worship, when defendant has been previously 
convicted of doing the same within a set 
amou nt of time (Subtype 1.3) 
North Dakota • N.D. Cent. Code, § 12.2-14-04 (2010)-
new crime ro injure , intimidate or interfere 
with a person because of that person 's charac-
reristics because the person has been, or ro 
keep the person from , usi ng a faci lity open 
to rhe publ ic (Subtype 1.3) 
• NY CLS Penal S 240.31 (2010) - prohibits dese-
crarion of a place of worship, cross burning, and 
placing symbols of hare (Subtype 4.1 and 4.2) 
• N.D. Cent. Code, § 12 .1-14-05 (2010)-
new crime of interfering with a person's c ivil 
righrs; bias nor required (Subtype 1.3) 
• NY CLS Civ. R. S 40-c (2010) - establishes 
right to be free of hare crimes 
Ohio • ORC Ann. 2927.12 (2010) - new crime 
prohibiting committing one of a short list of 
North Carolina • N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-401.14 (2010) - new crime 
of assaulting a person, damaging property, or 
threatening to assault or damage, because of 
the victim's characteristics; a lso prohibits 
reaching methods to accomplish this crime 
(Subtype 1.2) 
crimes because of the clrnracreristics of another 
person or group of people (Subtype 1.1) 
• O RC Ann. 2927.11 (2010)- includes desecration 
of a place of worship, cemetery, or of an object 
of reverence or devotion (Subtype 4.2) 
• N.C . Gen. Stat. S 14-3 (2010) - penalty 
enhancement which increases the level of crime 
for any misdemeanor committed because of the 
victim's characteristics (Subtype 2.1) 
• N .C. Gen Stat. S 14-12.13 (2010) - proh ibits 
placing an intimidating symbol, with the inten-
rion of intimidating a person or people, or ro 
Oklahoma • 21 Oki. Sr. § 850 (2010) - new crime prohibiting 
assaulting a person , damaging property, or 
threatening to assa ult or damage, maliciously 
and with the specific intent ro intimidate or 
harass another person because of that person's 
characrerisr ics; also prohibits inciting immi-
nent violence against a person because of that 
person's charac teristics (Subtype 1.2) 
prevent them from doing something lawful or 
to force them to do something unlawful 
(Subtype 4.1) 
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Oklanhoma (continued) • 21 Oki. Sr. § 1174 (2010) - prohibits cross 
burning with the intent to intimidate any 
person or group of people (Subtype 4 .1) 
• 21 Oki. St.§ 1765 (2010) - prohibits desecra-
tion of any house of worship and any object 
used for religious worship contained within 
(Subtype 4.2) 
• 21 Oki. Sr. S 915 (2010) - prohibits disturbing 
an assemblage of people gathered for religious 
worship (Subtype 1.3) 
Oregon • ORS S 166.155 (2010) - new crime prohibiting 
tampering with property or subjecting another 
person ro physica l contact because of the 
defendant's perception of the victim's charac-
terisrics; also prohibits threatening to inflict 
injury, commit a crime or damage property 
which would affect rhe person threatened or 
their family, because of the person's character-
isrics (Subtype 1.2) 
• ORS S 166.165 (2010) - new crime prohibiting 
rwo or more people conspiring to violate 
Section 166.155 (Subtype 1.2) 
Rhode Island (continued) • R.l. Gen. Laws § 11-44-31 (2010) - includes 
desecration of a place of worship, or place used 
for buria l or memoria lizing the dead, or the 
grounds adjacent to and owned by those places 
(Subtype 4.2) 
South Carolina • S.C. Code Ann. S 16-17-560 (2009) -
new crime prohibiting assaulting or intimidating 
a person because the victim's politica l opinions 
or because that victim exercised their rights ; 
bias nor required (Subtype 1.3) 
• S.C. Code Ann. § 16-5-10 (2009) - new crime 
prohibiting two or more people conspiring or 
going places with the intent ro injure, oppress 
or violate the person or property of another 
because of the victim's political opinions or 
because that victim exercised their rights; also 
prohibits interference with a person's rights; 
bias nor required (Subtype l.3) 
• S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-17-520 (2009) - prohibits 
willful and malicious disruption of a religious 
meeting (Subtype 1.3) 
• S.C. Code Ann. S 16-11-110 (2009) - places 
• ORS S 166.075 (2010) - includes desecration 
of a place of worship; must be done in a man-
ner likely to outrage public sensibilities 
of worship included as one of the types of 
buildings damaged which would increase the 
criminal degree of arson (Subtype 2.2) 
(Subtype 4.2) 
Pennsylvania • 18 Pa.C.S. S 2710 (2010) - new crime of 
committing specific substantive offenses with 
malicious intention toward the victim or victim; 
crime's level is one degree higher than the 
• S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-11-535 (2009) - includes 
damage to a place of worship, or agreeing or 
conspiring to do the same (Subtype 4.2) 
South Dakota • S.D. Codified Laws S 22-198-1 (2010) - new 
crime prohibiting causing physical injury to a 
underlying offense (Subtype 1.2) 
• 18 Pa.C.S. S 3307 (2010) - includes desecration 
of a place of worship, p lace for burial or 
memorializing the dead, or the grounds adjacent 
to and owned by those places (Subtype 4.2) 
person, or damaging or deface a person's prop-
erry, with the specific intent to intimidate or 
harass any person or specific group of people 
because of rhat person's or group of people's 
characteristics (Subtype I.2) 
• 18 Pa.C.S. S 5509 (2010) - includes desecration 
of a place of worship or burial, or of an object 
of venerarion by the public (Subtype 4.2) 
• S.D. Codified Laws§ 22-198-2 (2010) -
defines "deface" to include cross burning 
and placing hate symbols 
Rhode Island • R.l. Gen. Laws S 12-19-38 (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases the incarceration 
time if the victim or victim's property is 
• S.D. Codified Laws S 22-198-4 (2010) -
prohibits interfering with religious practice 
(Subtype I.3) 
selecred because of the defendant 's hatred or • S.D. Codified Laws S 22-19805 (2010) -
animus toward the actua l or perceived charac- prohibits forcing another to adopt or practice 
terisrics off the victim (Subtype 2.3) a particular religion (Subtype 1.3) 
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Tennessee • Tenn. Code Ann. S 39-17-309 (2010) - Utah (co 11ti1111ed) • Uta h Code Ann. S 76-3-203.4 (2010) -
establi shes right to be free of fear, intimidation , aggravating factor if offense is likely to incite 
harassment and bodily injury rega rdless of cer- community unrest or cause members of the 
rain characteristics; interference with that right 
by injuring, threatening, or damaging property 
community to fear for their physical sa fety or 
ro freely exercise their rights (Subtype 3.1) 
is a new crime; intending ro interfere whi le 
wearing a hood or mask is also a new crime 
(Subtype 1.2) 
• Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2010) -
Vermont • 13 Y.S.A. S 1455 (2010) - sentencing 
en hancement w hich add s incarceration rime 
for a ll crimes with a maximum penalty of less 
than five years if the conduct was ma liciously 
aggravating factor if defendant se lected the motivated by the victim's ac tua l or perceived 
victim or property damaged in a crime, in characteristics; for crimes with a maximum 
who le or in part, beca use of a bel ief or perccp- penalty of five years or more, rhe ma licious 
tion rega rding the characteristics; protected 
characteristics are more expansive than in 
motivation serves as an aggravating sentenc ing 
factor (S ubtype 2 .1 and 3.1) 
Secrion 39-17-309 (Subtype 3.1) 
• 13 Y.S.A . S 1456 (2010) - prohibits burn ing a 
• Tenn . Code. Ann. S 39-17-311 (2010) -
includes desecration of a place of worship or 
cross or religious symbol, with the intent to 
terrorize or harass a person or group of people 
buria l (Subtype 4 .2) (Subtype 4.1) 
Texas • Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art . S 42.014 
(2010) - sentencing enhancement that a llows 
• 13 Y.S.A . S 1458 (2010) - provides definiti ons 
which the state 's hare crime statures use 
collatera l pena lty of attendance at a tolerance 
ed ucation program if the victim or property was 
intentiona lly selected because of the defendant's 
bias or prejudice against a group identified by 
certain cha racteristics (S ubtype 2.3) 
Virginia • Ya . Code Ann. § 18.2-57 (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement which increases incarcera tion time 
for assault when the victim was selected beca use 
of the victim's charac teris tics (S ubrype 2.4) 
• Tex . Penal Code Ann . § 12.47 (2010) -
sentenc ing enhancement whic h increases level 
of c rime if an a ffirmati ve finding under Section 
• Ya. Code. Ann. S 18.2-423 (2010) - prohibits 
burning a cross with rhe intent ro intimidate a 
person or group of people (Subtype 4.1) 
42.014 of the Criminal Procedure Code was 
made (Subtype 2.1) 
• Ya. Code. Ann . S 18.2-423 . I (20 10)- prohibits 
placing a swastika on any place of worship or 
• Tex. Penal Code Ann. S 28.03 (2010)-
sentencing enhancement which increases the 
degree of criminal mischief if it harmed a place 
of worship or human buria l (Subtype 4.2) 
any place owned and opera ted by a religious 
body, with the intent ro intimidate a person or 
group of people (Subtype 4.1 ) 
• Ya . Code. Ann. S 18.2-423 .2 (2010) - prohibits 
• Tex. Penal Code Ann . § 28.08 (2010) -
sentencing enhancement which increases 
the deg ree of graffit i if it harmed a place of 
placing a noose in a number of places, with the 
intent ro inti midate a person or group of people 
(Subtype 4.1) 
worship or human burial (Su btype 4 .2) • Ya. Code Ann. S 18.2-127 (2010)- prohibits 
Uta h • Utah Code Ann . S 76-3-203.3 (2010) -
sentencing enhancement which increases 
rhe level of c rime for certain misdemeanor 
desecration of a place of worship or place of 
burial, or many objects associa ted with those 
places (Subtype 4. 2) 
offenses which are committed with rhe intent 
to intimidate or terrorize another person, 
which would cause that person ro reasonably 
fear exercising his or her rights; no bias 
• Va. Code Ann. S 18 .2-138 (2010)- includes 
breaking any window or door on a house of 
public worship (Subtype 4.2) 
necessa ry (Subtype 2.2) 
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Washington • Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 9A.36.080 (2010) -
new crime prohibiting causing physical injury, 
damaging property, or threatens to do some-
thing which puts the victim in reasonable fear 
harm a person or property, when the defendant 
maliciously and intentionally commits the act 
because of his or her perception of the victim's 
characteristics; allows inference that the defen-
dant intended to threaten the victim when the 
defendant burns a cross on an African American's 
property or places a swastika on the property of 
a Jewish person's properry (Subtype 1.2) 
•Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 9A.36.078 (2010) -
legislative findings relating to some of the 
inferences allowed for the state's hate crime 
statutes 
• Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 9.61.160 (2010) -
includes desecration of a place of worship 
(Subtype 4.2) 
West Virginia • W. Va. Code S 61-6-21 (2010) - establishes a 
person's right to be free of violence or intimi-
dation committed against that person because 
of his or her characteristics; interference with 
that right by force, injury, intimidation or 
threats is a new crime; conspiring to interfere 
with rights is also a new crime; teaching tech-
niques to interfere with rights is also a new 
crime (Subtype 1.2) 
• W. Va. Code S 61-6-21(d) (2010) - aggravating 
factor if any crime was committed because of 
the victim's characteristics (Subtype 3.1) 
• W. Va. Code§ 61-6-13 (2010) - prohibits inter-
fering with religious assemblies (Subtype 1.3) 
Wisconsin •Wis. Stat. S 939.645 (2010) - sentencing 
enhancement for specific substantive offenses if 
the defendant intentionally selected the victim 
or property because of a belief or perception 
regarding the characteristics of that person, 
whether or not the belief or perception was 
correct; increases incarceration time for most 
offenses, but increases level of the crime for 
highest level misdemeanors (Subtype 2.1 
and 2.3) 
•Wis. Stat. S 943.012 (2010) - includes desecra-
tion of a place of worship, or of a place of 
burial or memorializing the dead (Subtype 4.2) 
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Wyoming •Wyo. Stat. § 6-9-102 (2010) - new crime of 
denying a person the right to life , liberty or 
rhe pursuit of happ iness or the necessities of 
life because of the victim 's characteris tics 
(Subtype 1.3) 
Subtype 1.1: Prohibit L'.om mirring ot her c..:rirrn:s, hut aJJ a hias cll'mcnr 
Suhrypc 1. 2: Prohibit spcdfil.'. anions when 1..:ommittcJ hcl.'.a ust• of hias 
Suhrypc 1.3: Prohihir Jcpriv<trion of or inn.: r krin~ wirh ;.rnothcr's c..:ivi l ri!!,hts 
Subtype 2. 1: lrn.: rcaSl' the deg ree of a ll , or almost a ll , i:rimcs 
Subrypc 2.2: lni.:rcasc Jcgrcc of i.:rimcs involvinA intimic.larinn or h:lrassmcnr 
Subrypl' 2 . .1 : A<l<l jail timl' o r o th l· r c.:unscqm·ncl'S for all , or a lmost all , cr illl l'S 
Suhrypc 2.4: AJd jail timl' or orhcr co nscqul'!lc.:cs for c.: rimcs invol ving hara ssmcnr or 
inrimi<latio n 
Subtn>..: 3. 1: Dcdarc hias to he an aggravating fo<.:rnr for all cri me:-. 
Subtype 3.2 : Dcdarl' hias to be an ag~ra vating factor for nimcs in vo lving lrn r1.1ssmcnr nr 
inrimi<lation 
Subt ypl' 4. I: Prohibit Jisplayin)!. sym hols of Ila re o r hias 
Suhtypc 4.2: Dcsc:cration 
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Nar'I 
Jurisdiction General' Race Erhnicity Gender Color Orig. 
Federal x x x x 
Alabama x x x x 
Alaska x x x x 
Arizona x x x x 
Arkansas 
California x x x x 
Colorado x x x 
Connecticut x x x x 
DC x x x x 
Delaware x x x 
Florida x x x x 
Georgia x 
Hawaii x x x 
Idaho x x x 
Ill inois x x x x 
India na 
Iowa x x x x 
Kansas x x x 
Nar ' I 
Jurisdict ion General Race Ethnicity Gender Color Orig. 
Kentucky x x x 
Louisiana x x x x 
Mai ne x x x x 
Ma ryland x x x x 
Massachusetts x x x 
Michigan x x x x 
Min nesota x x x x 
Mississippi x x x x x 
Missouri x x x x 
Montana x x x 
Nebraska x x x x 
Nevada x x x 
New Hampshi re x x x 
New Jersey x x x x x 
New Mexico x x x x 
New York x x x x 
North Ca.rolina x x x 
Norrh Dakota x x x x 
Sex. 
Religion? Age Disability Orient. 
x x x 
x x 
x x' x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x x 
x x x 
x x x x 
x x x 
x 
x x' x x 
x x x x 
x x' x 
Sex. 
Religion Age Disabi lity Orient. 
x x 
x x x x 
x x' x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x 
x x x x 
x x' x 
x x x 
x 
x x x x 
x x x 
x x 11 x x 
x x x 
x x x x 
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PROT EC T E D C HARA CTE RISTI CS BY jURISDI C TION 
'General statures are t hose which dn nm lisr wha 1 pa rtic ular c haracte ris ti cs are protected. 
These imply rha r h ias, pre jud ice o r hare regard ing a ny charac ter is t ics mig ht ma ke the sta te's 
hare o r bia s rel a ted c rime sta ture app ly. 
~ Fo r purposes o f thi s cha rt , .. rel ig ion " and .. c reed" a re used interchangeably. even when li sred 
separately in a srn rute. 
JAlaska does nor rie hia s to 11ge, ill hea lth or homelessness. The stat ute instead makes it an 
aggrava t ing focmr if t he dc fc ndanr knew rhe vic tim was pa rr ic ula rl y vulncrah le o r incapa hle 
of res isrance due ro these or a ny orher facto rs. Disabilit y is one or these factors, but it is a lso 
one or t he protected characte ri stics for th e State's hias Statute. 
'Con nectic ut also li st s a lienagc ;is a protec ted charac teristic . 
(Illino is docs not tie bias m 11ge o r physica l hand icap. The state's sta tute instead ma kes it a n 
aggrav:11 ing foctur merely i ( the vict im has these characteristics. 
"Iowa a lso li sts po litica l aHl li :ltion as a pro tected ch:uacteristic. 
.,Kansas does nor ti e hias to age, infi rmity a nd reduced physical or menta l capacit y. The 
state's st:uurc in stead ma kes it a n aggr:wating factor merely i( the vict im has t hese charac ter-
isti cs and they should h:tve been known to rhc offender. 
11
Mainc docs nut tie bias ro agc. The sure's srar ute instead makes it an aggrava ting fac to r 
mcrel y if the victim has age related cha racte ri stics. 
~Mi ssi ss ip p i stature docs not tie bias to age o r disa bi lity. The state's stature instead makes it 
an aggrav:lting factor merely i( the vic tim has these cha racte r ist ics. 
•uMonrana a lso li srs involvement in civi l rights o r hum an rights ac tivities as a pmrecrcd 
c harac teri stic. 
11
Nehraska li sts pregnant women as a protected cha racteristic, but docs not ti c it co bias. Ir is 
an clement that must he proven beyond a reasnnahle doubt that the victim was ac tuall y preg-
na nr at t he rime of the offense . 
1
: Ncw Hampshire does not tic bi as tu age a nd physica l disa bilit y. T he crime must he one 
in volv ing the use of fo rce aga inst a person o r involving financi a l theft , with the intention o f 
cak ing advantage of the victim's vu lnerabil ity th at results from those cha racteristics . 
11
New Yo rk includes re ligions prac tice as a sepa rate protecred cha rac teri stic . 
1
' North Carolina includes nariona lit y as a sep3rate prorected charac teristic. 
ic vermont includes service in th e a rmed fo rces as a protecred cha racteristic. 
ll• Wesr Virginia includes polirica l affili atio n as a protected charac teri stic. 
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tween one and five years. This additional sentence must 
run consecutively (after the sentence for the underlying 
crime has been served). 
Louisiana has a law that increases the potential pen-
alty for defendants convicted of a hate crime. It differs 
from the Rhode Island statute by listing the underlying 
crimes to which it applies. However, the list is so extensive 
that the statute essentially applies to almost any crime 
which could be committed against the person or property 
of another because of the other's characteristics, including 
crimes beyond those typically intended to intimidate or 
harass. The statute makes it "unlawful for any person to 
select the victim of the following offenses against person 
or property because of actual or perceived race, age, gen-
der, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin, or ancestry of that person or the owner 
or occupant of that property because of actual or per-
ceived membership or service in, or employment with, an 
organization."58 The statute lists 33 crimes against person 
or property, ranging from murder to molestation to "com-
municating false information of planned arson."59 The 
court is permitted to sentence a defendant who falls under 
this statute to an additional $500 fine or an additional six 
months' incarceration, or both, if the underlying crime is 
a misdemeanor. If the underlying crime is a felony, the 
defendant may be fined an additional $5,000, or sen-
tenced to an additional five years' incarceration, or both. 
As in Rhode Island, the enhanced sentences in Loui-
siana run consecutively. A defendant convicted of a mis-
demeanor, which usually permits a maximum sentence of 
28 
EXPLAINING TYP ES OF HA TE CR IM ES 
up to one year's incarceration, can be sentenced to up to 
18 months. However, the criminal degree is not enhanced 
to a felony. As noted above, there is no consensus over 
how the enhancement statute affects subject-matter juris-
diction . It is unclear if a lower criminal court judge, with 
jurisdiction limited to misdemeanors, would still have 
subject-matter jurisdiction if the misdemeanor had a 
maximum possible sentence of more than one year, which 
is typically felony-only territory. 
We also place statutes that mandate collateral punish-
ments into Subtype 2.3. Collateral punishments are penal-
ties other than incarceration. The most common collateral 
punishments for hate or bias-related crimes are fines and 
reparations, community service, and participation in di-
versity programs. Most of the jurisdictions which have en-
acted these collateral punishments have tied them to spe-
cific intimidation and harassment crimes. However, a few 
have tied the collateral punishments to all, or almost all, 
hate or bias-related crimes. 
California has two statutes that allow or mandate 
community service as an additional punishment for peo-
ple convicted of bias-related crimes. One of these is related 
to specific intimidation acts that are intended to interfere 
with the rights of others and motivated by the victim's 
characteristics. California also has a catch-all statute au-
thorizing the court to "order a defendant who is convicted 
of a hate crime to perform a minimum of community ser-
vice, not to exceed 400 hours, to be performed _over a pe-
riod not to exceed 350 days."6° California separately de-
fines hate crime to mean "a criminal act committed, in 
29 
